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PRESUMPTIONS AND THEIR TREATMENT
UNDER THE LAW OF OHIO
H. S. SUBRIN*
Learned judges, professors of law prominent in the field of
evidence, and distinguished lawyers have for some time grappled
with the subject of presumptions in an effort to bring some order
from the confusion which has plagued the law on this topic. "Every
writer of sufficient intelligence to appreciate the difficulties of the
subject-matter has approached the topic of presumptions with a
sense of hopelessness and has left it with a feeling of despair." 1
"I have been converted, reconverted, unconverted, deceived,
disillusioned and had all sorts of things done to me in this field,"
said Judge Augustus Hand after listening to a heated debate at a
conference of the American Law Institute on a proposed rule for
proper treatment of presumptions in the trial court. At a later
meeting a different rule on the same problem was offered, wrought
by the efforts of the Institute's distinguished evidence committee,
which consisted of twelve outstanding judges and law teachers and
more than seventy consultants, with Professor Wigmore as the chief
consultant. Differences of opinion on the proposed rule were sharp
and unsuppressed. When the rule was offered and hotly debated, the
patience of Learned Hand reached its limit:
I am quite sure he [the reporter, Professor Morgan] is wrong
but it is no use to ask him to go over it again. We have been over
it ad nauseam. We spent days on it. The responsibility is yours.
You are the final word on this. Judges have mixed it up until
nobody can tell what on earth it means and the important thing is
to get something which is workable and which can be understood
and I don't care much what it is. I am beaten and through with
it and for myself I am frank to say I am not going to do anything
Of the firm of Harris, Sacks, Subrin & Goldman, Akron, Ohio. The writer is
deeply indebted to his former professor, Edmund M. Morgan, of the Harvard Law
School, whose numerous articles on presumptions have proved invaluable in the
preparation of this article.
1 Morgan, "Presumptions," 12 Wash. L. Rev. 255 (1937).
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more with it. You can refer it back but you won't get a lick of
work out of me on it.2
The hope of this article is to provide some clarification of the
law on this perplexing topic which has challenged judges in quest
of a just rule for the proper treatment of presumptions by trial
courts.
WHAT ARE PRESUMPTIONS?
There are scores of presumptions in the law, any one or more
of which may appear in a lawsuit, and the improper introduction,
omission, or removal of a presumption into or from a lawsuit may
decide its outcome. The frequent loose and indiscriminate use, as
well as the outright misuse, of the term "presumption," has caused
needless confusion. It has often been used to designate what are
more accurately termed inferences or substantive rules of law. It
has also been employed by courts as a loose synonym for presump-
tion of fact, presumption of law, rebuttable presumption, and ir-
rebuttable presumption.
One commonly accepted definition is that "'presumption' may
. . . be used to designate the assumption of the existence of one
fact which the law requires the trier of fact to make on account of
the existence of another fact or group of facts, standing alone." 3
Authorities call these later facts or groups of facts, which result in
the assumption of the presumed fact, the basic facts.4 Thus, if the
basic facts of (A), a marriage, and (B), birth of a child to the wife
during wedlock, are established, the court will assume the presumed
fact, (C), that the child is legitimate. Once the basic facts are
established, in the absence of adequate rebuttal evidence contrary
2 Quoted in Hellman, "Presumptions," 22 Can. B. Rev. 118, 133 (1944).
3 Morgan, "Some Observations Concerning Presumptions," 44 Harv. L. Rev.
906 (1931).
4 With regard to most presumptions it is necessary to establish the basic facts
before the presumed fact in the presumption can come into existence. This may be
accomplished by admissions or stipulation during trial, through the pleadings, by
judicial notice, by interrogatories, by evidence entitling the party seeking the use of
the presumption to a directed verdict as to the basic facts, or by satisfying the trier
of fact by the required proof that the basic facts exist. Of course, there may be some
argument as to what the basic facts in a particular presumption are. See Egger v.
Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 203 Wis. 329, 234 N.W. 328 (1931); Hansen v.
Central-Verein, 198 Wis. 140, 223 N.W. 571 (1929); Ewing v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 191 Wis. 299, 210 N.W. 819 (1926).
There are, however, a few presumptions that automatically make their appearance
without proof at the commencement of trial because the court takes judicial note of
them. Examples include the presumption of sanity of the accused in a criminal case,
the presumption of good reputation of the plaintiff in a libel suit, and the presumption
of innocence.
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to the presumption, the trier of fact, be it judge or jury, is compelled
to find the presumed fact.'
In 1898 a great authority on evidence wrote that, "Presump-
tion, assumption, taking for granted, are simply so many names for
an act or process which aids and shortens inquiry and argument." 6
"Thayer, Wigmore, the American Law Institute, and commentators
generally have argued, and many courts have agreed, that the term
'presumption' should be used only to mean that when A is estab-
lished in an action, the existence of B must be assumed unless and
until a specified condition is fulfilled. All courts agree that 'presump-
tion' is properly used in this situation, but there is wide disagree-
ment as to the terms of the condition." 7
Is a Presumption Evidence?
All competent evidence pertinent to a fact in issue must go to
the trier of fact. If a presumption is evidence it should not evaporate
upon the introduction of any rebuttal evidence which is contrary
to the presumed fact. If it does automatically vanish upon the
entry of such evidence, the jury cannot consider it, since logically
it is nonexistent.
Almost all legal scholars and commentators agree that a pre-
sumption is not properly termed "evidence." 8 On this point Thayer,
Wigmore, and Morgan are in full accord.9 Despite this scholarly
consensus that presumptions are not evidence in the true sense of
the word, there is law, both legislative and judicial, rebelling against
the idea that presumptions born out of strong policy are to be
easily eliminated by rebuttal evidence. The effect of such law is to
treat presumptions as evidence or in the nature of evidence or as
having the effect of evidence, thus avoiding a directed verdict with
5 See Carson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 165 Ohio St. 238, 135 N.E.2d 259
(1956).
6 Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 315 (1898).
7 Morgan, "How to Approach Burden of Proof and Presumption," 25 Rocky Mt.
L. Rev. 34, 43 (1952).
s A presumption is not evidence and is not to be weighed as evidence. Carson v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra note 5. Maguire struck at the jugular when he
pointed out that "by very definition a presumption means to us a rule about the effect
of evidence, and not evidence per se." Maguire, Evidence, Common Sense & Common
Law 190 (1947). "Presumptions are not evidence. Presumptions effect only the
burden of offering evidence." Tracy, Evidence 30 (1952).
9 "To consider a compelled assumption as evidence or to weigh it with evidence
seems to involve a mental operation impossible of practical comprehension, to say
nothing of understandable exposition or explanation to a jury." Morgan, supra note 3,
at 908. See Thayer, op. cit. supra note 6, at 314-15; 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2491 (3d
ed. 1940); McBaine, "Presumptions, Are They Evidence?" 26 Calif. L. Rev. 519
(1938). See also Note, "Evidence: Presumptions as Evidence-A Reply," 31 Calif.
L. Rev. 316 (1943).
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regard to the presumed fact and often requiring that the jury be
instructed to weigh the presumption with the other evidence in the
case.'0 Some courts have held that a presumption remains in the case
until the jury has decided that the evidence of the opponent on
the presumed fact is equal to or countervails the presumption."
One commentator expresses the view that anything occurring at
trial which might influence the ultimate judgment of the jury,
whether or not evidence in the strict sense, could properly be re-
garded as evidence or its equivalent. Accordingly, he argues, an
instruction by the court as to the creation of the presumption and
the reasons underlying it might influence the ultimate judgment ol
the jury. As such it acts as evidence." Of course, those decisions
prohibiting mention of the presumption by the court in its charge
once the presumption vanishes by virtue of adequate contrary evi-
dence would exclude this factor from the consideration and ultimate
judgment of the jury.
By legislation, California, 3 Oregon, 4 and Montana," in defining
evidence, have included presumptions. The result has been that
presumptions cannot ordinarily be liquidated by rebuttal evidence;
accordingly, they must go to the jury.
10 See Morgan, supra note 3, at 908 nn.5 & 6 for numerous cases cited as
examples, where at one time or another presumptions were regarded as evidence.
See also New York Life Ins. Co. v. Beason, 229 Ala. 140, 155 So. 530 (1934);
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Maddox, 221 Ala. 292, 128 So. 383 (1930); Arkmo Lumber
Co. v. Luckett, 201 Ark. 140, 143 S.W.2d 1107 (1940); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Taylor, 128 Ark. 155, 193 S.W. 540 (1919); O'Brien v. New England Mut. Ins.
Co., 109 Kan. 138, 197 Pac. 1100 (1921); Exkendorf v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 154 La.
183, 97 So. 394 (1923); Bryan v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 174 Tenn. 602, 130 S.W.2d
85 (1939).
11 Speck v. Sarver, 20 Cal. 2d 585, 128 P.2d 16 (1942); In re Rohde's Estate,
158 Cal. App. 2d 19, 323 P.2d 490 (Ct. App. 1958); Savarese v. State Farm Mut.
Auto Ins. Co., 150 Cal. App. 2d 518, 310 P.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1957); Lewis v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 113 Mont. 151, 124 P.2d 579 (1942); Wyckoff v. Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 173 Ore. 592, 147 P.2d 27 (1944); Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v.
Prieto, 169 Tenn. 124, 83 S.W.2d 251 (1935). See also Note, "Insurance-Presump-
tion Against Suicide and Burden of Proof," 14 Tenn. L. Rev. 45 (1934). Concerning
the presumption against suicide, New York has held, "nor is it the sort of 'presumption'
that serves only to shift the burden of proof and disappears from the case as soon
as evidence to the contrary is shown." Wellish v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
293 N.Y. 178, 184, 56 N.E.2d 540, 543 (1944). This was also the law in Ohio until
Ayers v. Woodard, 166 Ohio St. 138, 140 N.E.2d 401 (1957).
12 See Reaugh, "Presumptions and the Burden of Proof," 36 Ill. L. Rev. 819
(pt.2 1942).
'3 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1957, 1961, 2061.
14 Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 41.040, 41.080, 41.310 (1963).
15 Rev. Codes of Mont. tit. 93-301-5,-301-10 (1947).
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Terms Erroneously Treated as Synonymous with Presumption
Inference
Although sometimes a presumption encompasses, or is based
upon, an inference, the two terms are not synonymous. A presump-
tion is a mandatory deduction or assumption, while an inference is
a permissible deduction. Thus, "an inference is a deduction of an
ultimate fact from other proved facts, which proved facts, by virtue
of the common experience of man, will support but not compel
such deduction. A jury may attach probative value, or evidentiary
weight, to such a deduction in the same manner and to the same
extent it may accept, reject or attach probative value to positive
testimony or direct evidence." 1
The carelessness with which courts have used the terms is well
illustrated by three Ohio cases in which the same process was desig-
nated differently without regard to the important, different pro-
cedural effects of the term employed. With regard to an accepted
presumption of agency, one court called it an "inference," 17 another
called it a "presumption," " and a third called it a "presumption or
inference" in the opinion and a "presumption" in the syllabus. 9
Whether, given certain basic facts, a presumption or inference arises
must be decided from the cases in the particular jurisdiction; and
often there is no unanimity in the jurisdiction or among the various
state courts as to whether an inference or presumption result under
particular facts.
Conclusive or Irrebuttable Presumption
This term has been used "as the operative part of a weasel-
worded formula for saying that from the judicial or legislative point
of view certain things are taken as so and attempts to contradict
them are futile." 20 This simply means that the legislature or court,
for reasons of public policy or expediency, has made the basic fact
equivalent to the presumed fact. The presumed fact becomes unde-
batable and cannot be refuted by any evidence. Common examples
include the presumption of a lost grant in favor of a person adversely
possessing land over a long period of time, or the presumption in
some states that a child under a certain age cannot commit a felony.
16 Ayers v. Woodard, 166 Ohio St. 138, 145, 140 N.E.2d 401, 406. The court cites
Fink v. New York Cent. R.R., 144 Ohio St. 1, 56 N.E.2d 456 (1944); Glowacki v.
Northwestern Ohio Ry. & Power Co., 116 Ohio St. 451, 157 N.E. 21 (1927); and
Sobolovitz v. Lubric Oil Co., 107 Ohio St. 204, 140 N.E. 634 (1923), to support its
statement.
17 Rosenberg v. Reynolds, 11 Ohio App. 66 (1918).
18 Schmidt & Schmidt v. Schwab, 17 Ohio App. 127 (1922).
19 Fach v. Canton Yellow Cab Co., 36 Ohio App. 247, 173 N.E. 245 (1929).
20 Maguire, Evidence, Common Sense & Common Law 185 (1947).
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Another example appears in the Negotiable Instruments Law, which
provides that where the instrument is in the hands of a holder in
due course, a valid delivery thereof by all parties prior to him so
as to make them liable to him is conclusively presumed.21 It is im-
material that the maker can prove that the note was lost or stolen
from him by the payee, since by virtue of the statute, want of
delivery is no defense against a holder in due course. The new
Commercial Code has recognized this evidentiary guise for a sub-
stantive rule of law by eliminating the word "presumption" and
merely stating that a holder in due course "takes the instrument
free from.., all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom
the holder has not dealt.. . with some enumerated exceptions.2
Presumption of Fact
The term "presumption of fact" is a synonym for "inference."
Inaccurately, the Ohio Supreme Court once called a simple inference
a Cpresumption in fact as well as law" 23 when a witness within the
control of a party was not called to testify nor his absence explained.
Under those facts the jury might infer that his testimony would be
unfavorable. This is not a presumption of law. Careful analysis
reveals that the proper term here is "inference." 24
Presumption of Law
This term should not be used because it is misleading. When-
ever it is used, it refers either to a rebuttable presumption or a
substantive rule of law. For example, for years in some Ohio courts
in cases involving the issue of negligence, the court needlessly and
erroneously charged the jury, "that at the outset and for purposes
of the trial, the law presumes that the defendant was not negligent
in any manner, and before it can be found by you that the defend-
ant was negligent in any manner, it must be proven against the
defendant by the greater weight of the evidence." This so-called
"presumption of no negligence" is not a presumption. Its office is
locative and it is nothing but a substantive rule which fixes the
burden of proof of negligence on the plaintiff and operates against
him if he has failed to introduce evidence of negligence. In Wolf v.
Hawk,25 although the court loosely labelled the presumption of no
negligence a "presumption of law," it correctly treated it as a sub-
stantive rule and held that, after the plaintiff introduced some
evidence on the issue of negligence, the presumption had "no place
21 Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law § 16.
22 Uniform Commercial Code § 3-305.
23 State v. Champion, 109 Ohio St. 281, 289, 142 N.E. 141, 143 (1924).
24 See Morgan, supra note 7, at 43.
25 63 Ohio App. 122, 25 N.E2d 460 (1939).
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in a charge to the jury. .... It . . . determines the issue in the
absence of evidence, and is solely for the consideration of the
court." 26 The court pointed out that "after the introduction of
evidence of probative value on an issue of negligence, the presump-
tion of law no longer prevails." 27
Another substantive rule often incorrectly called a presumption
relates to the presumption of due care on the issue of contributory
negligence. However, the defendant already has the burden of proof
on the issue of contributory negligence,28 consequently, once he
has introduced evidence on that issue, the "presumption" of due
care on the part of the plaintiff "is like a handkerchief thrown over
something also covered by a blanket." A Minnesota court made the
same analysis. 29
The confusion that results from expressing substantive rules of
law in the form of presumptions was long ago expressed by Thayer,
who observed:
At the outset, we must take notice of a thing which easily escapes
attention: namely, that much of the substantive law is expressed
presumptively, in the form of prima facie rules. This evidential
form of statement leads often to the opinion that the substance
of the proposition is evidential; and then to the further notion,
that inasmuch as it is evidential, it belongs to the law of evidence.
This is error.30
EXAMPLES OF TRUE PRESUMPTIONS AND THE
REASONS FOR THEIR CREATION
It might prove helpful to set forth a few well-known examples
of rebuttable presumptions, the genuine type and the only kind
hereafter treated, with the reasons for their creation. They are not
alike, despite a strong tendency by courts and some commentators
20 Id. at 124, 25 N.E2d at 461-62.
27 Ibid. Other courts have likewise recognized that presumptions of this variety
are correctly only rules of lawv locating the burden of persuasion ("proof") or the
burden of producing" evidence upon penalty of non-suit, and that once evidence pertinent
to the non-existence of the presumed fact is introduced, the "presumption" is gone
for all purposes. See Bailey v. City of Ravenna, 280 Ky. 21, 132 S.W.2d 532 (1939)
(presumption of validity of ordinance) ; Sheldon v. Wright, 80 Vt. 298, 67 Atl. 807
(1907) (presumption against malpractice); Yeary v. Holbrook, 171 Va. 266, 198
S.E. 441 (1938) (presumption against negligence); see also Thayer, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 339, 346; Laughlin, "In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions,"
52 Mich. L. Rev. 195 (1953).
28 See Brown v. Henderson, 285 Mass. 192, 189 N.E. 41 (1934) (Lummus, J.,
concurring).
29 TePoel v. Larson, 236 Minn. 482, 53 N.W.2d 468 (1952).
30 Thayer, op. cit. supra note 6, at 185.
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to treat them alike procedurally. "Presumptions are created for
different reasons and might logically enough be tough or tender
according to the nature and force of those reasons." 31
The examples represent rebuttable presumptions which the law
designed for one or more of the following reasons: (1) as proce-
dural conveniences, (2) to dissolve a legal impasse, (3) to satisfy
a deep-rooted social need, (4) because experience demonstrated
their inherent probability, or (5) because the facts were within
the peculiar knowledge of the opponent of the presumption.
(A) The Presumption of Liability of a Bailee.
Plaintiff-owner parks his automobile in a parking lot; he leaves
the keys in the ignition and pays the operator of the lot. Upon his
return the automobile is missing. The operator contends that he
was in constant attendance but cannot account for the car's dis-
appearance. The owner sues the operator for its loss, alleging neg-
ligence. Here the burden of proving negligence is on the owner. But
how can he sustain his burden? He does not know the circumstances
surrounding the loss or theft; it would be difficult for him to dis-
prove the contentions of the operator. The law has come to the
owner's rescue with a presumption, without which recovery might
be impossible: where property is delivered to a bailee, and the bailee
on demand fails or refuses to deliver it to the bailor, a presumption
of liability on the part of the bailee arises.32
Thus, if the owner establishes the basic facts of delivery of the
automobile to the operator, demand for its return, and failure or
refusal of the operator to return it, the court must, in the absence
of adequate rebuttal testimony, direct a verdict for the owner on
the issue of negligence. This presumption was devised to assist the
owner on the issue of negligence when all he could probably do,
having no knowledge of what happened in his absence, is prove his
car was not there when he sought to claim it. The facts concern-
ing the care of the operator and the circumstances surrounding
the loss are more accessible to the operator than the owner.
(B) The Presumption of Agency.
0 owns a truck and hires S, his servant, to drive it. While S
is operating it he injures T, who sues 0. The accident occurs at an
hour which may either be within S's working hours or while S is
on a "frolic of his own." T must prove, among other things, that
the tort was committed within the scope of S's employment. 0
denies agency.
31 Maguire, Evidence, Common Sense and Common Law 185 (1947).
32 Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Constantine, 144 Ohio St. 275, 58 N.E2d 658 (1944).
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Here, the facts are within the peculiar knowledge of S and 0.
Unaided by presumption and having no evidence on authority, T
would suffer a directed verdict on the issue of agency. Since it is
probable that a servant, hired for that purpose, while driving the
owner's car, is working for the owner at the time of the accident,
and since 0 and S know better than T whether S was then at work
in behalf of 0, the law has declared that a presumption arises that
the servant was acting within the scope of his authority.3 The
justifications for this presumption are, first, accessibility of facts
and, second, probability or common experience? 4
(C) The Presumption of Death After Seven Years Absence.
A, the assured, left home and was unexplainedly not heard
from for more than seven years. He has a small estate and a life
insurance policy. His wife has no means of knowing if he is still
alive. As it is a sound policy not to leave A's assets unsettled
indefinitely, the law found fit to provide that, if one leaves his
usual place of residence and goes to parts unknown or a distant
place, and is not heard from for a period of seven years, a pre-
sumption arises that he is dead.35
(D) Presumption of Innocence.
A, the accused, is tried for murder. His defense is insanity.
It is axiomatic that the accused must be proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of all the essential elements of the offense, includ-
ing an intent to commit it. It is equally clear that the accused, if
devoid of reason, is incapable of forming the requisite criminal
intent. However, practically all courts reason that, since most
men are normally sane and it would needlessly entail a great expen-
diture of time and expense to prove sanity in every criminal case,
the accused will be presumed to be sane. Following an often adopted
rule, Ohio invokes the presumption, and adds that insanity is an
affirmative defense which casts the burden of proof of that issue on
the accused.36
33 Fiocco v. Carver, 234 N.Y. 219, 137 N.E. 309 (1922) ; Fach v. Canton Yellow
Cab Co., 36 Ohio App. 247, 173 N.E. 245 (1929); Schmidt & Schmidt v. Schwab, 17
Ohio App. 127 (1922); Rosenberg v. Reynolds, 11 Ohio App. 66 (1918).
34 "A presumption upon a matter of fact, when it is not merely a disguise for
some other principle, means that common experience shows the fact to be so generally
true that courts may notice the truth." Greer v. United States, 245 U.S. 559, 561
(1917).
35 See, e.g., Brunny v. Prudential Ins. Co., 151 Ohio St. 86, 84 N.E.2d 504 (1949).
36 In view of the Ohio law and those jurisdictions that follow it, the presumption
of sanity can create a state of confusion which would challenge not only the most
intelligent juror, but judges and attorneys as well. With regard to the defense of
insanity, "the burden is upon such defendant to establish such defense by a pre-
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRESUMPTIONS AND THE
BURDEN OF PROOF: Two CONFLICTING VIEWS
Presumptions cannot be discussed abstractly or in isolation.
Despite the fact that they are two distinct legal concepts, presump-
tions are inseparably integrated with burden of proof. The conflict-
ing decisions and resulting ambiguities concerning presumptions
are a result of this relationship. They occur because courts have
carelessly used the term "burden of proof" to denote either of two
burdens which are different and also because there is sharp dis-
agreement as to the effect of a presumption on the burden of proof.
The term "burden of proof" has been used in two distinct
senses. In the first sense, burden of proof is the risk of non-produc-
tion of evidence to make a prima facie case. According to the
Model Code of Evidence, the "'burden of producing evidence of a
fact' means the burden which is discharged when sufficient evidence
is introduced to support a finding that the fact exists." 37 Burden
of proof in the second sense is the burden of persuasion, which is
defined as follows: "'burden of persuasion of a fact' means the
burden which is discharged when the tribunal which is to deter-
mine the existence of the fact is persuaded by sufficient evidence
to find that the fact exists." 3
A hypothetical set of facts will bring into bold relief the
ponderance of the evidence. This does not, however, relieve the state of the general
burden to prove each and every element going to make up the offense charged by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt." Long v. State, 109 Ohio St. 77, 141 N.E. 691 (1923). For
example, the state, at the commencement of the trial, has the benefit of the presumption
that the accused is sane. Under Ayers v. Woodard, supra note 11, if the accused intro-
duces substantial credible evidence of insanity, the presumption disappears; the state
must then prove the sanity of the accused as well as every element of the offense,
including intent (and the capacity to form an intent) beyond a reasonable doubt. On
the other hand, insanity, under the Ohio law, is an affirmative defense and the accused
has the burden of proving that issue by a preponderance of evidence. Legal insanity
precludes the capacity to form that intent required under the law to convict the accused.
The following awkward, difficult, and incomprehensible situation ensues for the judge
and jury. If the judge decides the presumption of sanity has disappeared, the state
must prove the accused sane beyond a reasonable doubt; it must also prove intent to
commit the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. On the other hand, if the judge rules
the presumption has not been destroyed by the contrary evidence of the accused, the
state is still obligated to prove intent (which presupposes capacity to form an intent)
beyond a reasonable doubt. And the accused need prove insanity (which precludes
capacity to form an intent) by a preponderance of the evidence. How can a juror in-
telligently understand and apply the pertinent instructions covering the situation? In
the case of City of Toledo v. Gfell, 107 Ohio App. 93, 95, 156 N.E.2d 752, 753 (1958),
the court held that the rule with regard to presumptions announced in Ayers v. Wood-
ard, supra, "would apply with equal cogency to the trial of criminal cases."
37 Model Code of Evidence rule 1(2) (1942).
38 Model Code of Evidence rule 1(3) (1942).
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problems of presumption, burden of proof, and the effect of the
presumption on burden of proof. Let us assume that W, a wife,
sues X insurance company on a 10,000 dollar life insurance policy
issued on the life of her husband, H, designating W as the benefici-
ary. The policy provides for double indemnity in case of accidental
death. W seeks 20,000 dollars, alleging H's death was accidental. X
denies the death was accidental and in its answer alleges that the
death was suicidal; further, that except for the fraudulent material
misrepresentations of H, it would not have issued the policy.
Lawyers know the general rules, which hold that: (1) W's
petition must allege facts constituting her cause of action; (2) X's
answer can deny allegations in W's petition, but must ordinarily
plead the facts constituting an affirmative defense; (3) when
death occurs under circumstances which make it doubtful whether
it was caused by accident or suicide, the presumption is that it was
accidental; (4) W has the initial duty of producing evidence that
H died accidentally; (5) W also has the ultimate burden of per-
suading the trier of the facts that the death was accidental; (6)
X has the initial duty of producing evidence that the policy was
issued as a result of fraudulent and material misrepresentations by
H, as well as the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of the
facts that the policy was issued as a result of such misrepre-
sentations.
Our major question here is whether, once the presumption of
accidental death appears, X has to prove H's death was suicidal
and not accidental. What principle of law determined 1, 2, 4, 5,
and 6? And what principle answers our anterior, major question? 39
39 Is there one rule of law which will guide the court in deciding which party has
the initial burden of pleading and the burden of proof (in its double sense) as to each
issue in the case? The answer is no I One commentator has stated,
There is... no key-principle which governs the apportionment of the burden
of persuasion. In ascertaining the party who is to carry this burden, we can
only look to the practice which the courts in the light of tradition and their
notions of convenience, fairness and policy, have worked out in the particular
type of case, for the ... burden of persuasion.
McCormick, Evidence 675-76 (1954). "[Ilt is at once apparent that no one uni-
versal solvent has been found for all cases. This is just as well, for none is necessary."
Ray, "Burden of Proof and Presumptions," 13 Texas L. Rev. 33, 37 (1934).
Ohio provides that, "The party who would be defeated if no evidence were offered
on either side, first, must produce his evidence, and the adverse party must then pro-
duce his evidence." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2315.01(C) (Page 1953). "[This] . . . is
rather a statement of the effect of a rule than an explanation of the principle under-
lying it." Hanbury, "The Burden of Proof," 61 Juridical Rev. 121, 130 (1949). Rather
it is meaningless, for it aids neither court nor lawyer in determining who must first
produce evidence and who has the ultimate burden of proving each issue upon penalty
of dismissal. See also Wige v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 205 Wis. 95, 236 N.W. 534
(1931) ; Morgan & Maguire, Cases on Evidence 48 (3d ed. 1951).
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W will suffer a directed verdict if, after she has rested her case and
before the defendant puts on any evidence, she has not produced
sufficient evidence to justify a finding in her favor by the jury. In
such a case she will not have sustained the burden of proof in the
first sense, that is, the burden of producing enough evidence to
make a prima facie case. W will likewise fail if, when the case goes
to the jury, she has failed to convince the jury that H's death was
accidental. In such a case W will not have sustained her burden of
proof in the second sense, that is, the burden of persuasion.
We know that W is aided somehow by the rebuttable pre-
sumption against suicide upon a showing of death by external and
violent means.40 However, how and when is this done? 41 What
effect does this rebuttable presumption of accident have on W's
burden of persuasion? It is the answer to such questions that has
caused violent disagreement among commentators and contra-
dictory decisions among courts.
All agree that, once the presumption comes into operation,
the opponent must come forward with evidence to rebut the pre-
sumption: otherwise, the presumption is mandatory upon the
jury. This refers solely to the duty of the opponent of the pre-
sumption to come forward with evidence contrary to the presump-
tion in the area, although Thayer maintained that presumptions
only "throw upon him against whom they operate, the duty of
meeting this imputation, on the particular point to which they
relate .... This appears to be the whole effect of a presumption,
and so of a rule of presumption." 42 With respect to the burden of
persuasion, or burden of proof in the second sense, however, there
is no strict uniformity among jurisdictions concerning the effect of
presumptions.
One extreme, as noted, is the Thayer view, now reflected in
rules 701-704 of the American Law Institute's Model Code of
Evidence.43 These rules provide that, except for the presumption
40 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2309.29 (Page 1953) provides, "Neither presumptions
of law, nor matters of which judicial notice is taken, need be stated in a pleading...."
This dispenses with the necessity of pleading the presumption; only the basic fact or
facts need be pleaded. However, the presumed fact could be pleaded and proved by
evidence of the basic facts which give rise to the presumption.
41 See Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Clemmer, 79 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1935);
Carson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra note 5.
42 Thayer, op. cit. supra note 6, at 336.
43 Rule 701. Definitions.
(1) Basic fact-Basic fact means the fact or group of facts giving rise to a pre-
sumption.
(2) Presumption-Presumed Fact-Presumption means that when a basic fact
exists the existence of another fact must be assumed, whether or not the other fact
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of legitimacy, a presumption disappears upon the introduction by
the opponent of evidence which would support a finding of the
non-existence of the presumed fact. This one rule for all presump-
tions has been applied by many courts. Neither Thayer nor the
Model Code states how much and what quality evidence the
opponent must produce to effect this.
Although Thayer's analysis has not always been accepted
unqualifiedly, the gist of the argument advanced by his supporters,
who maintain that a presumption ceases to exist upon proof of
rebuttal evidence, is generally as follows: each party has two bur-
dens, the burden of producing evidence to avoid a directed verdict,
and the burden of persuading the jury to grant him a verdict. With
respect to the first burden, a presumption imposes on the opponent
only the duty to introduce some evidence contrary to the presump-
tion which would justify a finding in his favor. The evidence to be
produced by the opponent to liquidate the presumption, depending
on the law of the particular jurisdiction, must be such as to "support
a finding of the non-existence of the presumed fact," "adequate,"
"any," "substantial," "credible," "substantial credible," or "some."
Once such evidence is produced the presumption has accomplished
its purpose and it leaves the lawsuit. The presumption, having made
its exit, should not then be mentioned to the jury. It is not evi-
dence and cannot thereafter be weighed with the evidence of the
proponent of the presumption.
may be rationally found from the basic fact. Presumed fact means the fact which must
be presumed.
(3) Inconsistent presumptions-Inconsistent presumptions means presumptions the
presumed fact of one of which is inconsistent with the presumed fact of the other.
Rule 702. Establishment of Basic Fact.
The basic fact of a presumption may be established in an action by the pleadings,
or by stipulation of the parties, or by judicial notice, or by evidence which compels a
finding of the basic fact, or by a finding of the basic fact from the evidence.
Rule 703. Presumption of Legitimacy.
Whenever it is established in an action that a child was born to a woman while
she was the lawful wife of a specified man, the party asserting the illegitimacy of the
child has the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuading the trier of
fact beyond reasonable doubt that the man was not the father of the child.
Rule 704. Effect of Presumptions.
(1) Subject to Rule 703, when the basic fact of a presumption has been established
in an action, the existence of the presumed fact must be assumed unless and until either
evidence has been introduced which would support a finding of its non-existence or the
basic fact of an inconsistent presumption has been established.
(2) Subject to Rule 703, when the basic fact of a presumption has been estab-
lished in an action and evidence has been introduced which would support a finding
of the non-existence of the presumed fact or the basic fact of an inconsistent presump-
tion has been established, the existence or non-existence of the presumed fact is to be
determined exactly as if no presumption had ever been applicable in the action.
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Thayer's followers argue further, that the second burden, the
burden of persuasion as to any issue, having been determined by
the pleadings, can never shift from one party to the other during
the lawsuit. It follows, then, that a presumption cannot shift that
burden-that is, the opponent never inherits the burden of per-
suasion as a result of the presumption-and, a fortiori, a presump-
tion no longer in the case is equally helpless to do so. However, the
spectrum of application of this theory is varied.
In many cases, though the presumption has been dissipated,
there often is a substantial logical connection between the basic
fact and the presumed fact. Accordingly, the proponent of the
presumption need not despair, for, if he has established the basic
fact, he will get to the jury despite the death of the presumption,
since the jury in such factual situations may infer the presumed
fact from the basic facts. The court, in such a case, must submit to
the jury for its determination the existence or non-existence of the
presumed fact.
At the other extreme, farthest from the Thayer view, some
hold that a presumption not only requires the opponent to come
forward with evidence contrary to the presumed fact, but also
shifts to the opponent the burden of persuading the trier of fact
that the presumed fact does not exist.44 For example, all agree that
this occurs with regard to the presumption of legitimacy." Most
courts hold that the burden of persuasion is shifted to the pro-
ponent of a will by the presumption of undue duress resulting from
a transaction involving a fiduciary who, as legatee under the will,
has profited unjustly at the expense of the disinherited heirs who
would normally be the natural objects of the testator's bounty.40
Several states maintain that the same burden shifts to the oppo-
nent in bailment cases by virtue of the presumption of negligence.
And Pennsylvania for a long time maintained that a presumption
always shifted the burden of persuasion to the opponent-a position
no longer followed in that state.4 7
In the same vein, there is authority which holds that in auto-
mobile tort cases involving the issue of agency (or consent from
the owner to the driver) a statutory presumption of consent does
not vanish despite a denial of control or consent by the owner or
the driver. There is also authority for the view that the presumption
44 Doud v. Hines, 269 Pa. 182, 112 Atl. 528 (1921).
45 In re Findlay, 253 N.Y. 1, 170 N.E. 471 (1930).
46 Page v. Phelps, 108 Conn. 572, 143 Atl. 890 (1928); Soureal v. Wisner, 321
Mo. 920, 13 S.W.2d 548 (1928). Ohio represents the minority view. See Caswell v.
Lermann, 85 Ohio App. 200, 88 N.E2d 405 (1948) ; Board of Educ. v. Pendleton, 80
Ohio App. 249, 75 N.E.2d 182 (1947) ; Cave v. McLean, 66 Ohio App. 196, 32 N.E2d
581 (1939).
47 See Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 497, 173 AUt. 644 (1934).
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of control survives and is available to the proponent until the jury
finds "proven the circumstances of the situation with reference to
the use made of the car and the authority of the person operating
it to drive it.... In cases of this sort the presumption is equivalent
to evidence, because it permits the plaintiff to go to the jury with
nothing more.
Those who oppose the Thayer theory contend that every pre-
sumption has been created to serve a specific judicial or legislative
need, purpose, or policy; and, since the reason or policy creating
the presumption may be strong, the presumption should remain
throughout the trial and be mentioned to the jury. There should
be an instruction that, despite any rebuttal evidence (except evi-
dence so clear as to require a directed verdict with regard to the
presumed fact), the presumption should continue until the jury is
satisfied that the non-existence of the presumed fact is as likely or
probable as its existence. Some have even argued that a presump-
tion should shift the burden of persuasion on the issue touched
to the opponent.49 The argument advanced here is that Thayer
was basically wrong when he assumed that the burden of persuasion
as to an issue can never shift in a lawsuit, and his tainted assump-
tion has been cited and adopted by many courts, without analysis
of its logic or validity, in the teeth of substantial precedent.
In my view, there is nothing talismanic in the argument that,
because the pleadings initially determine the issues and the plead-
ings and substantive law initially determine the burden of persua-
sion, the burden of proof thereafter is precluded from shifting as
a result of a presumption. Certainly shifting the burden of per-
suasion to the opponent after the proponent gains title to a pre-
sumption is not unprecedented. Moreover,
had . . . [Thayer] traced for himself and for us the historical de-
velopment of peremptory rulings he might have been led away
from the inexpedient conclusion that the burden of proof could
never be shifted by a presumption, which represented a break with
existing authorities and which certainly was not logically neces-
sary. Had he not been so dogmatic he might have recognized that
presumptions could be given other effects than his prima facie
effect, thus allowing courts more elasticity in the use of the pre-
sumption device.50
48 O'Dea v. Amodeo, 118 Conn. 58, 66, 170 AtI. 486, 488 (1934).
49 Maguire, op. cit supra note 8, at 187. See Bohlen, "The Effect of Rebuttable
Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden of Proof," 68 U. Pa. L. Rev. 307 (1920).
50 Reaugh, "Presumptions and the Burden of Proof," 36 Ill. L. Rev. 703, 712
(pt.1 1942). The same commentator further points out that "prior to Thayer both
the Civil law ... and Common law... authorities all assumed that presumptions of
law did shift the burden of proof." Id. at 712 n.61.
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Contrary to Thayer, there are many decisions today holding
that certain presumptions have the effect of shifting the burden
of proof. The obvious case is the presumption of legitimacy result-
ing from proof of birth in wedlock, which all authorities agree
shifts the burden of proof to the opponent. The ancient rule to that
effect is well sustained in modem times, although the degree of
proof varies from one jurisdiction to another."'
At the beginning of a criminal trial there is a presumption of
sanity of the accused which operates in favor of the prosecutor. If
the prosecution were not required to prove capacity to form an
intent, there would be no need for this presumption. If the accused
denies capacity to form an intent-pleads not guilty by reason
of insanity-the law in most jurisdictions has shifted the burden
of persuasion to the accused, who must persuade the jury he was
insane at the time of the offense. 52 That some courts designate in-
sanity an affirmative defense detracts not one whit from the notion
that as a result of the presumption the burden thereafter was with
the opponent.
In the bailor-bailee cases where the bailor proves delivery of
the property to the bailee in good condition and there is either no
redelivery or a failure to redeliver in good condition, a presumption
of want of due care or negligence on the part of the bailee arises.
The "bailee may ordinarily rebut the presumption of negligence or
lack of due care by proof of loss arising from theft or fire." 5 Con-
trary to the views of those who maintain that the burden of per-
suasion never shifts, there are at least ten states which "hold that
where the bailor proves delivery of the property to the bailee in
good condition and the failure to redeliver upon legal demand, the
burden of proof shifts to the bailee to prove that he exercised due
care to prevent loss of the property. This is the rule adopted in
Michigan, Minnesota, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nevada, New Jersey,
Montana, Illinois, New York and Nebraska." "'
Likewise, in a suit to set aside a will on the grounds of undue
influence, the contestant initially has the burden of introducing
evidence and the burden of persuading the jury on the issue of
undue influence. However, once he has established that the rela-
tionship between testator and the legatee who displaced the natural
51 Even the Model Code of Evidence, though ostensibly representing the Thayer
view, has recognized that the presumption of legitimacy shifts the burden of proof.
It treats this presumption as an exception to the general rule. See Model Code of
Evidence rule 703, supra note 43.
52 See text at note 36 supra. See also Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413 (1928),
and infra at 208-10.
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objects of a testator's bounty in the will was of a fiduciary nature,
some courts have held that the use of undue influence is presumed
and the burden of proof shifted to the proponent of the will who
has the burden of proving there was no undue influence.-"
Finally, in Connecticut, a statute provided that "proof that
the operator of a motor vehicle was the husband, wife, father,
mother, son or daughter of the owner, shall raise a presumption
that such motor vehicle was being operated as a family-car within
the scope of a general authority from the owner, and shall impose
upon the defendant the burden of rebutting such presumption." 5 A
Connecticut reviewing court reversed a trial court which had set
aside a verdict for the plaintiff in a suit against the son who oper-
ated the car and the father who owned it.5 7 The plaintiff merely
established the basic fact that the son drove the car belonging to
the father, which raised a presumption of consent under the statute.
The trial court "considered that the evidence of these witnesses
[father and son] was such that the jury could not disregard it
and were obliged as matter of law to find in accordance with it.""s
The reviewing court, however, held that the presumption survived
the testimony of the witnesses until the jury "finds proven the
circumstances of the situation with reference to the use made of
the car and the authority of the person operating it to drive it," 5"
leaving the burden of persuasion on the issue of authority with
the plaintiff.
The wealth of precedent sketched above notwithstanding, the
American Law Institute in 1941 adopted the Thayer rule, set forth
in rule 704.60 However, still dissatisfied, Morgan argued:
What I object to in the Thayerian rule is this: the creation of
a presumption for a reason that the court deems sufficient, a rule
of law if this basic fact stands by itself there must be a finding of
a presumed fact, whether the jury would ordinarily find it from
the basic fact or not; but then the total destruction of the pre-
sumption just the minute some testimony is put in which anybody
can disbelieve, which comes from interested witnesses, and which
is of a sort that is usually disbelieved. It seems to me it is futile
to create a presumption if it is to be so easily destroyed. And the
case where the evidence would ordinarily take the case to the jury
anyhow, the basic fact would ordinarily justify a finding of the
presumed fact, is the case where a presumption is not so much
needed. There I will agree, I should not make a very strong argu-
5 See Page v. Phelps, supra note 46; Soureal v. Wisner, supra note 46.
56 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1152 b (1933).
57 O'Dea v. Amodeo, 118 Conn. 58, 170 Atl. 486 (1934).
5s Id. at 66, 170 Atl. at 489.
,9 Id. at 66, 170 Atl. at 488.
GO See note 43 supra.
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ment against the Thayerian rule because it is going to be in the
hands of the jury anyhow. But I think that you ought to give
greater effect to a presumption than the mere burden of putting in
evidence which may be disbelieved by the trier of fact. 1
The Thayer rule has been followed by many courts (in some
instances with an absence of clarity) ,62 but the spectre which pro-
duced Morgan's justifiable fears has been somewhat allayed as a
result of legislation and decisions which have adopted rule 704
with a qualification, i.e., that the rebuttal testimony must be cred-
ible, thus eliminating the possibility of a directed verdict upon the
introduction of suspect testimony from interested witnesses or of
unbelievable rebuttal evidence. 3
THE EFFECT OF PRESUMPTIONS ON BURDEN OF PROOF UNDER
OHIO LAw
For many years Ohio treated the effect of presumptions on the
burden of proof in a manner that gave full recognition to the legal
forces responsible for their creation. That is, Ohio refused to ter-
minate a presumption upon the mere introduction of testimony
which would justify a finding that the presumed fact did not
61 Quoted in Helman, "Presumptions," 22 Can. B. Rev. 118, 134 (1944). Discus-
sions appear in Forword to Model Code of Evidence at 57 (1942).
02 See Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Clemmer, supra note 41; Silva v.
Traver, 63 Ariz. 364, 162 P2d 615 (1945) ; Kirschbaum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
133 N.J.L. 5, 42 A.2d 257 (Ct. Err. & App. 1945) (error to charge that, if evidence
is balanced, jury may take the presumption into consideration) ; MeIver v. Schwartz,
50 R.I. 68, 145 AtI. 101 (1929) ; City of Montpelier v. Town of Calais, 114 Vt. 5, 39
A.2d 350 (1944) (contrary evidence which tends to show that the real fact is not as
presumed makes the presumption go for naught). The rule is now followed by the
United States Supreme Court. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 303 U.S. 161 (1938).
03 See e.g., Speck v. Sarver, supra note 11, Ayers v. Woodard, supra note 11,
Wyckoff v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra note 11, Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co.
v. Prieto, supra note 11, Bradley v. Savidge, 13 Wash. 2d 28, 123 P.2d 780 (1942).
In Ohio, Chief Justice Taft wisely recognized the danger implicit in an unquali-
fied acceptance of Thayer when he observed in a concurring opinion that:
There may be instances where the only evidence produced or introduced to
rebut the presumption against suicide is evidence which the jury may quite
properly disbelieve in exercising its function as trier of the facts and judge
of the credibility of witnesses. In such an instance, if the rule is as broadly
stated as is suggested in paragraph two of the syllabus of Hassay v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 140 Ohio St., 266, 43 N.E. (2d), 299, or in paragraph
three of the syllabus of Hyrbar v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 140 Ohio St.,
437, 45 N.E. (2d), 114, then incredible evidence or evidence having no weight
whatever could be effective in making the presumption against suicide dis-
appear. Obviously, that would be unreasonable.
Carson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 165 Ohio St. 238, 244-45, 135 N.E.2d 259, 263
(1956) (concurring opinion).
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exist. Except in rare cases, the presumption went to the jury under
proper instructions. This was a compromise between the two ex-
treme views outlined above.
Shifting the Burden of Proof
As early as 1906, in Klunk v. Hocking Valley Ry., 4 the court
announced, "to rebut and destroy a mere prima facie case, the party
upon whom rests the burden of repelling its effect, need only pro-
duce such amount or degree of proof as will countervail the pre-
sumption arising therefrom." '5 In other cases, the Ohio court has
gone so far as to say that certain presumptions continue until
removed by evidence which meets or overcomes the presumption.6
In Hall v. Hall,67 the lower court was reversed because the
charge to the jury was misleading
in that it no where distinctly states nor sufficiently emphasizes that
the order of probate of the will, by the probate court, raises a pre-
sumption that the will so probated is the valid last will and testa-
ment of [testator] . . . that before they [the jury] would be
entitled to return a verdict setting aside the will they must be able
to find that the evidence adduced by the contestant... outweighs
both the evidence adduced by the defendant ... and the presump-
tion arising from the order of the probate court admiting the will
to probate as the valid last will and testament of [testator] .... 68
Likewise, Ohio has consistently maintained that the burden
of proof in its second sense, the burden of persuasion, never shifts, 9
and that, consequently, a presumption cannot cause the burden of
proof to shift. Nevertheless, there are several obvious instances
under Ohio law where the burden of persuasion does shift as a result
of a presumption's entering the case, despite the judicial pro-
nouncements to the contrary. For example, there has never been
any question under Ohio law that, where the basic facts establish
a presumption of legitimacy, the burden of proof is shifted to the
opponent of the presumption, who challenges the legitimacy of
the child.70
04 74 Ohio St. 125, 77 N.E. 752 (1906).
05 Id. at 133, 77 N.E. at 754.
00 See, e.g., Tresise v. Ashdown, 118 Ohio St. 307, 160 N.E. 898 (1928) (evi-
dence sufficient to counter balance) ; Kennedy v. Walcutt, 118 Ohio St. 442, 161 N.E.
336 (1928) (meet, extinguish, rebut, countervail or overcome).
07 78 Ohio St. 415, 85 N.E. 1125 (1908).
68 Id. at 416, 85 N.E. at 1125. (Emphasis added.)
069 Brunny v. Prudential Ins. Co., 151 Ohio St. 86, 42 N.E.2d 504 (1949) ; Smith
v. Lopa, 123 Ohio St. 213, 174 N.E. 735 (1931) ; Tresise v. Ashdown, supra note 66;
White Oak Coal Co. v. Rivoux, 88 Ohio St. 18, 102 N.E. 302 (1913) ; Ginn v. Dolan,
81 Ohio St. 121, 90 N.E. 141 (1909). See also Ohio Jur. 2d Evidence §§ 155, 157
(1956).
70 State ex rel. Walker v. Clark, 144 Ohio St. 305, 58 N.E.2d 773 (1944).
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Another example, explicit in Hall, is the presumption of the
validity of a will and the testator's competency once the will has
been admitted to probate. Here, Ohio has held that by virtue of
that presumption the contestant of the will cannot win unless the
evidence offered by him preponderates when compared with the
weight of the evidence of the proponent in favor of validity, to
which must be added the weight of the presumption of validity.71
Commentators might be at a loss to explain how a jury can weigh
a presumption; however, cases like Hall exhibit the length to which
some courts will go to insure that a presumption survives rebuttal
evidence.
Again, where a statute creates a presumption of transfer in
contemplation of death where the transfer was made within two
years of death, "unless the contrary is shown," 72 the statute has
been construed to hold that the transferee "has the burden of
overcoming the presumption against him by a preponderance of
the evidence." 73
The cases above are examples where the presumption has
patently shifted the burden of proof to the opponent of the pre-
sumption. Moreover, there are other cases in Ohio where a pre-
sumption, in essence, does the same thing-that is, causes the
burden of proof to shift-but, refusing to abandon the concept that
the burden of proof never shifts, the courts have indulged in semantic
exercises to avoid deviation from their established position.
With regard to the presumption of negligence against the bailor,
Ohio, adopting Thayer's view, has consistently held that
"the burden of proof in such a case [bailment] does not shift
with the evidence, but remains with the bailor, who must prove his
case by a preponderance of all the evidence."
At least that is the rule more nearly consistent with previous pro-
nouncements of this court upon the subject of burden of proof. 4
"Where, however, the bailee proves loss of the bailed article by
theft but attempts no explanation of the circumstances and offers
no proof of facts from which an inference of due care may be drawn,
he does not rebut the presumption of negligence arising from his
failure to return the bailed property." 75
Again, the Ohio Supreme Court, steadfastly clinging to its posi-
tion that the burden of proof does not shift, in a case involving a
71 Hall v. Hall, supra note 67.
72 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5731.04 (Page 1953).
73 In re Estate of Walker, 161 Ohio St. 564, 570, 120 N.E.2d 432, 435 (1954).
74 Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Constantine, 144 Ohio St. 275, 288, 58 N.E.2d 658, 664
(1944).
75 Id. at 286, 58 N.E.2d at 664.
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suit to set aside an antenuptial agreement on the grounds that it
was unfair, unreasonable, and fradulent held that:
if the provision for the prospective wife is, in the light of sur-
rounding circumstances, wholly disproportionate to the means of
her future husband and to what she would receive under the law,
the burden rests on those claiming the validity of the contract to
show that there was a full disclosure of the nature, extent and
value of the intended husband's property, or that she had full
knowledge thereof without such disclosure, and that she, with this
knowledge, voluntarily entered into the antenuptial settlement.
• . . the burden of proof does not shift in Ohio . . . [however]
disclosure as a justification or excuse for the disproportionateness
is an affirmative defense.70
Here the widow starts out with the burden of producing evi-
dence and the burden of persuading the jury that the antenuptial
agreement is unfair, unreasonable, and fraudulent. Once she estab-
lishes the basic fact that the provisions in the agreement for her
are wholly disproportionate, she has presumptively proved that the
contract is unfair and unreasonable. The fact of unfairness is there-
after assumed until and unless the defendant shows that there was
"full disclosure of the nature, extent and value of the intended
husband's property, or that she had full knowledge thereof without
such disclosure, and that she, with this knowledge, voluntarily
entered into the antenuptial settlement." 77 The presumed fact of
unfairness, in the absence of proof of disclosure, knowledge, and
voluntary acceptance, is mandatory on the trier of fact. Here, the
proponent of the contract, the opponent of the presumption, is
encumbered with the double burden of coming forward with and
of proving facts that, in essence, constitute fairness. In effect, the
presumption of unfairness from the basic fact of disproportion has
shifted the burden of proving fairness to the opponent, and a new
affirmative defense has been created in preference to acknowledging
that the burden of persuasion on the issue of fairness has shifted.
"A burden phrased in terms of explaining or exculpating is difficult
to distinguish from a burden of persuading." 7-
76 Juhasz v. Juhasz, 134 Ohio St. 257, 264, 16 N.E.2d 328, 331 (1938).
77 Ibid.
78 McCormick, Evidence 644 n.24 (1954).
The same might be said with regard to the presumption of sanity in a criminal
case. Ohio courts open with the presumption at the outset of trial that the accused is
sane, even though the state must prove every element of the offense, including intent
to commit it, which cannot exist if the accused is insane. Nevertheless, Ohio begins
with the presumption of sanity in favor of the state and then concludes that the ac-
cused must prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. Despite the fact that
this is called an affirmative defense, it is in essence a disguise for shifting the burden
of proof.
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Effect of Rebuttal
The unequivocal judicial pronouncements noted above on the
quantum of rebuttal required to liquidate a presumption were
seemingly ignored in Baily v. Weaver.79 In that case, the plaintiff
sought to reach a car-owner's insurer after recovering a judgment
against the driver. In the action against the driver and the owner's
insurer, the central issue was whether the driver had the owner's
consent. Plaintiff was aided by a presumption which was sufficient
to make a prima facie case. This would have precluded a directed
verdict against her, however, she chose to call the owner as her own
witness to prove consent. The owner testified that the driver had no
consent to drive the car at the time of the accident. Plaintiff also
called the driver, a nephew of the owner, for cross-examination: he
too denied consent, but his denial was impeached by showing a
prior inconsistent statement.
The jury could have disbelieved either or both of these inter-
ested witnesses s0 had the issue been submitted to them, however,
the court decided that the presumption remained only while there
was "no substantial evidence to the contrary. When such evidence
is offered, the presumption disappears, and in the absence of further
proof there is nothing to justify a finding in accordance with the
presumption." 81 The court directed a verdict for the defendant,
holding that the owner's testimony constituted substantial rebut-
tal evidence, came from the plaintiff's own witness, and, accordingly,
barred the issue of consent from the jury. The court recognized
that ordinarily the credibility of witnesses is a matter for the jury,
but felt that considerations related to the impermissibility of im-
peaching one's own witness took this case out of the province of
the jury. 2
Why should evidence from interested witnesses, conceivably
unworthy of belief, be regarded as sufficient evidence to overcome
a presumption rooted in public policy? "Insufficient evidence is, in
79 67 Ohio App. 259, 35 N.E.2d 1006 (1941).
80 Compare Pariso v. Towse, 45 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1930) ; O'Dea v. Amodeo, 118
Conn. 58, 170 At. 486 (1934) ; McIver v. Schwartz, 50 R.I. 68, 145 Atl. 101 (1929).
81 Baily v. Weaver, supra note 79, at 270, 35 N.E.2d at 1011.
S2 The deeply-rooted doctrine of vouching for the credibility of one's own witness
is surely too broadly applied in Baily.
Analytical justification of the restrictions is on the whole a contemptible
failure. Reasoning that a party may pick and choose his own witnesses and
should therefore be bound by utterances of those whom he elects to use is so
plainly untrue in most unpremeditated litigation that it would not be offered
except by way of strained effort to sustain a convention.
Morgan & Maguire, Cases on Evidence 245 n.3 (3d ed. 1951) ; see Ladd, "Impeach-
ment of One's Own Witness-New Developments," 4 U. Chi. L. Rev. 69 (1936).
[Vol. 26
PRESUMPTIONS UNDER OHIO LAW
the eyes of the law, no evidence." 83 As Judge Taft observed in his
concurring opinion in Carson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., unbe-
lievable evidence should have no effect on a presumption, despite
Thayer's position that when any evidence is introduced the pre-
sumption vanishes."4
In Baily,85 the jury might have agreed with the court, but it
was never given a chance. This was a perfect situation for letting
the presumption go to the jury, for the trial lawyer and litigant are
unconcerned with whether you call a presumption "evidence" or
treat it as evidence for the sake of getting by a directed verdict,
so long as the litigant has his day in court. As one court aptly
expressed it, "no matter what the philosophical reasoning may be,
the result is the same in that a jury question is presented." 6 There
are decisions recognizing that witnesses interested in the outcome
of the case are prone to be partial, and that presumptions are in
the nature of evidence.17 Accordingly, the presumptions should
remain in the case though contrary evidence has been offered.
The reasoning of the court in Baily indicates that the result
might not have been the same had the owner and driver offered
their testimony in behalf of the insurer, but that, in that event, the
court might have been persuaded by cases holding that a presump-
tion will not lose its applicability by the direct testimony of inter-
ested witnesses.8 " Sound reasoning, it appears, should refuse to re-
gard a presumption as ephemeral, especially where rebuttal evidence
comes from interested witnesses, regardless of sponsorship.
In situations where the driver and owner are defendant's wit-
nesses and not plaintiff's, trial courts let cases go to the jury on
the presumption of consent. For example, this conclusion was
reached in Cebulak v. Lewis,"9 which held that a statutory pre-
sumption of consent did not disappear when competent evidence
to rebut the presumption had been adduced. It would seem that the
conclusion should be the same regardless of whether the presump-
tion of consent is statutory or otherwise.
83 Matter of Case, 214 N.Y. 199, 203, 108 N.E. 408, 409 (1915).
84 Carson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 165 Ohio St. 238, 135 N.E2d 259 (1956)
(concurring opinion).
85 Baily v. Weaver, supra note 79.
80 Egger v. Northwestern Life Ins. Co., 203 Wis. 329, 336, 234 N.W. 328, 330,
(1931).
87 Smellie v. Southern Pac. Co., 212 Cal. 540, 299 Pac. 529 (1931); Chaika v.
Vanderberg, 252 N.Y. 101, 169 N.E. 103 (1929); Ferris v. Sterling, 214 N.Y. 249,
108 N.E. 406 (1915) ; Wyckoff v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 173 Ore. 592, 147 P.2d 227
(1944). See also text at notes 10-15 supra; Annot., 95 A.L.R. 878, 883-85 (1935);
McBaine, "Presumptions, Are They Evidence?" 26 Calif. L. Rev. 519, 550 (1938).
88 See Reinhart v. Oregon-Wash. R. & N. Co., 174 Wash. 320, 24 P2d 615 (1933).
89 320 Mich. 710, 32 N.W2d 21, 5 A.L.R.2d 186 (1948).
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Judge Hand, in Pariso v. Towse,9 ° a case similar to Baily, left
the credibility of the witnesses to the jury, holding that the court
could not direct a verdict. The case dealt with a New York statute
imposing liability on the owner of a truck if the driver had the
consent of the owner. There was, of course, a presumption that the
owner had consented to the truck's use. The court said,
The mere fact of his possession of the truck did not support an
inference of consent .... It appears from the foregoing that, by
the New York law, either the presumption must be treated as
evidentiary at all stages of the case, or else that upon this issue
a denial may be taken as positive evidence of consent. In ordinary
cases it is indeed settled law for us that a jury need not accept
a party's uncontradicted evidence .... 91
Thus the presumption went to the jury and competed with the
interested witness' denials and the force of the presumption was
not broken by evidence that the jury might refuse to believe-a
decision which appeals to common sense.
In 1957, the case of Ayers v. Woodard 9 2 marked a milestone
and a departure for Ohio on the subject of presumptions. In that
case the plaintiff sued a sheriff to recover damages alleged to have
been caused by an assault and battery on plaintiff by McCarty, a
deputy sheriff. One of the issues was "whether the deputy sheriff
was acting within the scope of his capacity as an officer of the law
at the time of the incident." The trial court charged the jury that
"his [McCarty's] acts will be presumed to have been performed in
his capacity as such deputy sheriff, and anyone who claims that
Jerome McCarty was not acting as a deputy sheriff must show
affirmatively that such was the case, by overcoming such presump-
tion by a preponderance of the evidence." 93 The Supreme Court in
Ayers correctly decided that "the charge of the trial court regard-
ing the presumption .. .placed too great a burden upon the de-
fendants .... ," 94 Speaking through Judge Matthias, the court said:
A presumption is a procedural device which is resorted to only in
the absence of evidence by the party in whose favor a presumption
would otherwise operate; and where a litigant introduces evidence
tending to prove a fact, either directly or by inference, which for
procedural purposes would be presumed in the absence of such
90 Supra note 80.
91 Pariso v. Towse, .supra note 80, at 965.
92 Ayers v. Woodard, 166 Ohio St. 138, 140 N.E2d 401 (1957).
93 Id. at 141, 140 N.E.2d at 404.
94 Id. at 145-46, 140 N.E.2d at 406.
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evidence, the presumption never arises and the case must be sub-
mitted to the jury without any reference to the presumption in
either a special instruction or a general charge.95
Referring to cases wherein it was held reversible error to charge
the jury on the presumption where the party having the benefit
of the presumption offered direct evidence on the presumed fact,
the court, in its opinion, stated:
The rationale of the decisions is that a presumption is dispositive
solely where neither party introduces substantial credible evi-
dence regarding the fact to be presumed. Conversely, when either
party introduces substantial credible evidence tending to prove
a fact which would otherwise be presumed, the presumption either
never arises or it disappears. If, for example, the presumption
operates in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, then
it never arises if the plaintiff introduces evidence tending to prove
it, i.e., plaintiff has no need for the aid of the presumption, or, if
the plaintiff has sought the aid of the presumption by nonproduc-
tion of evidence and the defendant introduces evidence of a sub-
stantial nature which at least counterbalances the presumption,
then it disappears. 96
There appeared no judicial necessity for the announcement of
a new rule in Ohio with regard to the procedural effect of a pre-
sumption and the ancillary question of the propriety of mentioning
the word "presumption" to the jury. These could easily have been
avoided and for that reason might be considered obiter.
With one simple declaration the court could have disposed of
the entire case by declaring that the charge was reversible error,
citing Klunk v. Hocking Valley Ry., W Tresise v. Ashdown 8 and
several other decisions as the law of Ohio for more than fifty years.
These cases held, in accordance with the well established general
rule,
that to rebut and destroy a mere prima facie case, the party upon
whom rests the burden of repelling its effect, need only produce
such amount or degree of proof as will countervail the presump-
tion arising therefrom. In other words, it is sufficient if the evi-
dence offered for that purpose, counterbalance the evidence by
which the prima facie case is made out or established, it need not
overbalance or outweigh it.9a
95 Id. at 138-39, 140 N.E.2d at 401 (syllabus).
96 Id. at 144-45, 140 N.E2d at 406.
97 Klunk v. Hocking Valley Ry., supra note 64.
98 Tresise v. Ashdown, supra note 66.
99 Klunk v. Hocking Valley Ry., supra note 64, at 133, 77 N.E. at 754.
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Not content to decide the case on clearly established law and
there end the matter, the court went on to add, that "presumptions
are indulged in only to supply facts" and are "dispositive solely
where neither party introduces substantial evidence regarding the
fact to be presumed. Conversely when either party introduces sub-
stantial credible evidence tending to prove a fact which would other-
wise be presumed, the presumption either never arises or it disap-
pears." 1o0 The court then added that the facts of the case were
susceptible of an inference that the deputy was acting within his
authority, and that such inference constituted substantial credible
evidence. Since the issue of authority could get to the jury without
the presumption, the presumption never entered the case: if it did,
it perished when the potential inference made its appearance.
The view expressed in Ayers sounds like rule 704(2) in the
Model Code of Evidence 10' with the important qualification that
Ohio now requires from the opponent of the presumption "sub-
stantial credible evidence" contrary to the presumed fact to elimi-
nate the presumption from the case. In one respect it is a significant
improvement on Baily and on Thayer, for it requires the testimony
of the opponent of the presumption to be worthy of belief and sub-
stantial before the presumption is driven from the case. However,
the rule as thus announced is not free of problems; in fact, new ones
have entered the scene.
What quantity and quality is "substantial?" The court did not
define it and what it means is not clear. One court defined substan-
tial evidence as evidence "near enough to the issue to be logically
significant." 102 In that case a denial by the owner of an automobile
that the driver had consent to operate the automobile was not con-
sidered substantial, that is, it was not sufficient to destroy the pre-
sumption of control. If the jury rejected the denial, the presumption
remained. 3 On the other hand, the Supreme Court has stated "that
the evidence to overcome the effect of the presumption must be
substantial adds nothing to the well understood principle that a
finding must be supported by evidence." 104 There are suggestions
that the evidence is substantial even if it comes from interested
witnesses, "provided that their testimony is uncontradicted, unim-
peached, clear and convincing." 105
100 Ayers v. Woodard, supra note 92, at 144, 140 N.E. at 406.
101 See note 43 supra.
102 Pariso v. Towse, supra note 80, at 964. The same court later indicated it would
have to be evidence to support a finding. Alpine Forwarding Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R,
60 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1932).
103 Pariso v. Towse, supra note 80. See also Chaika v. Vanderberg, .supra note 87.
104 Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. 280, 286 (1935).
105 Bradley v. S. L. Savidge, Inc., 13 Wash. 2d 28, 63, 123 P2d 780, 795 (1942).
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Shortly before Ayers, the court, in talking of an inference (which
lacks the mandatory quality of a presumption and the stamp of
some policy or need as its genesis) stated:
It is true that any inference or deduction may be, in a given case,
totally destroyed by evidence to the contrary. But for this court
to say, as a matter of law, that an inference is overcome by direct
testimony to the contrary, such direct testimony must be such that
reasonable minds could not reach different conclusions as to its
preponderating value when measured against the weight of the
circumstantial evidence.'00
Certainly a presumption created for cogent reasons ought to be
considered to have more surviving power than an inference in the
face of contrary evidence.
An additional problem results from the undefined word "credi-
ble." A Wisconsin court summarily dismissed the question by
stating:
While the language relating to the quantum of evidence varies
somewhat, the terms used as "credible evidence," "some evi-
dence," and "evidence" are practically, as used, synonymous....
The real question is, in a particular case, is there or is there not
evidence of the fact found?107
In Ayers, though the presumption went out of the case, the
issue went to the jury on the possible inference. Suppose, however,
there is no potential inference in the case, but the evidence contrary
to the presumption comes from interested witnesses or parties. Who
is to judge the credibility of the evidence contrary to the presump-
tion? Ayers indicates that the court makes that decision. The same
court in Hrybar v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,08 held that the weight
of the opponent's rebuttal evidence was a jury question. As indi-
cated, in New York, Connecticut, and Michigan, the presumption
of consent in the automobile cases remained if the jury rejected the
owner's denial of any consent to the driver's use of the car. One
court stated "as experience has justified the ends for which they
[presumptions] were called into being, they should not be discarded,
because forsooth in some of their aspects, they may not fit into the
framework of logical analysis." 10' Other courts have held that, ex-
106 Hurt v. Charles J. Rogers Trans. Co., 164 Ohio St. 329, 334, 130 N.E.2d 820,
824 (1955).
107 Hills Dry Goods Co. v. Industrial Comm'n., 217 Wis. 76, 83, 258 N.W. 336,
339 (1935).
108 140 Ohio St. 437, 45 N.E2d 114 (1942).
109 Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Prieto, 169 Tenn. 124, 167, 83 S.W. 251,
267 (1935).
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cept where the contrary evidence warrants a directed verdict as to
presumed fact, the liquidation of the presumption in the face of
rebuttal evidence is to be the province of the jury."0
Where does Ayers leave Tresise, Hall, Klunk, Carson, and a
host of other Ohio cases which consistently left the presumption in
the case until it was overcome by adequate rebuttal evidence to the
satisfaction of the jury? The writer's opinion is that the court in
Ayers did not consider carefully enough, at least with respect to
some presumptions, the usual province of the jury with regard to
the credibility of witnesses who offer rebuttal testimony. For ex-
ample, what will the court say of the presumption of legitimacy,
universally recognized as shifting the burden of persuasion to the
party who challenges the legitimacy of a child born in wedlock? 111
Will this presumption disappear upon the introduction of substan-
tial credible evidence to the contrary? Also, will not the court have
to acknowledge that the statutory presumption of the validity of a
will upon probate is evidence, shifts the burden of proof to the
opponent of the presumption, and does not perish upon the intro-
duction of "substantial credible evidence?" 112
Despite judicial pronouncements that the presumption of inno-
cence merely cast upon the prosecution the burden of proving the
accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,"' Ohio statutory law
requires the trial court, in its charge to the jury to "state the mean-
ing of presumption of innocence, and read . . . [the] definition of
reasonable doubt." 14 Moreover, the statutes create a presumption
of transfer in contemplation of death if made within two years of
death and shift the burden of persuasion to the transferee to show,
by a preponderance of the evidence," 5 that the transfer was not
made in contemplation of death."0 At least Ayers cannot override
these specific statutory provisions.
With regard to the presumption of sanity, what is the court
going to say, in view of Ayers, where the accused has introduced
substantial credible evidence of insanity? Is the accused still
shackled with the burden of proving insanity by a preponderance of
the evidence? Or, by virtue of the dissipation of the presumption,
has the burden returned to the state to prove beyond a reasonable
110 Gillett v. Michigan United Traction Co., 205 Mich. 410, 171 N.W. 536 (1919);
Ryan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 206 Minn. 562, 289 N.W. 557 (1939).
.11 State ex rel. Walker v. Clark, 144 Ohio St. 305, 58 N.E2d 773 (1944).
112 See Kennedy v. Walcutt, 118 Ohio St. 307, 160 N.E. 898 (1928).
113 Morehead v. State, 34 Ohio St. 212 (1877).
114 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.04 (Page 1953).
115 In re Estate of Walker, supra note 73.
118 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5731.04 (Page 1953).
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doubt the sanity of the accused, as well as the other elements of
the offense? 117
When the wife commits a crime in the presence of her husband
does the presumption of coercion automatically leave the scene when
there is evidence rebutting it; or is the policy that gave birth to the
presumption so strong that such an easy demise would be considered
unjustifiable homicide? 118
It is both interesting and speculative as to whether the court
hereafter will apply the ruling of Ayers to a case involving a letter
properly addressed to the addressee and properly stamped with
sufficient postage and deposited in a mail box, which basic facts give
rise to the presumption that it was duly received. One Ohio court
held, prior to Ayers,
this presumption "does not stand merely until evidence comes
in to cause it to then disappear. It continues as evidence, to be
considered in the light of all the facts and circumstances adduced
on the trial and to be given such weight as the triers think it
entitled to in determining the fact at issue, whether, the mailed
letter was received.""1
9
117 Upon analysis, it is axiomatic that an accused, if insane at the time the offense
was committed, cannot be convicted of the crime-he must be acquitted. Because most
men are sane, the law presumes that the accused was sane at the time of the offense.
Obviously, if it were not necessary in the first place for the state to prove the accused
sane, there would be no necessity to indulge in the presumption. Ohio, too, operates
under this presumption. In addition, it holds, as has been previously pointed out, that
if the accused contends that he was insane at the time of the offense, the burden is
on him to prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. Paradoxically, Ohio
still maintains that the state nevertheless is obligated to prove every element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. It follows that, except for the presumption, the
state logically would have to prove the accused was sane. Now, under Ayers v.
Woodard, suppose substantial credible evidence of insanity was introduced by the
accused, the opponent of the presumption of sanity. Under Ayers the presumption
of sanity would then go out the window, and the state would be back to proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that every element of the offense was committed by an
accused who was sane at the time. Can you imagine the dilemma that confronts the
trial judge when such substantial credible evidence has been introduced by the accused
on the issue of sanity? The state no longer can rely upon the presumption if Ayers
is applicable. Quaere: Does that mean that the accused has been relieved of the burden
of proving insanity by a preponderance of the evidence? One can see the perplexing
problems confronting the trial judge-and the jury-in determining the effect of sub-
stantial credible evidence on the presumption, the burden of proof, and the proper
instructions to the jury. In State v. Stewart, 176 Ohio St. 156, 198 N.E2d 439
(1964), the court once more stated the presumption. There was no reference to the
effect of substantial credible evidence on the life of the presumption.
118 See Tabler v. State, 34 Ohio St. 127 (1877).
119 Stevens-Davis Co. v. Parkway Oils, Inc., 27 Ohio L. Abs. 126, 127 (Ct. App.
1937). The court's quotation is from Atlantic Dredging & Const. Co. v. Nashville
Bridge Co., 57 F.2d 519 (5th Cir. 1932).
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Another held that this presumption of delivery "is a rebuttable
presumption and may be met by evidence of equal weight to over-
come the presumption of delivery." 120 Of course, the court could
distinguish those cases by declaring that the basic facts create an
inference of delivery, with no need for a presumption, making the
presumed fact of receipt issuable and determinable by a jury, de-
spite substantial credible rebutting evidence. A Massachusetts court
adopted a similar view.121 Justice Lummus explained that
the mailing of a letter properly addressed and postpaid... does
not merely create a presumption ... but rather constitutes prima
facie evidence . . .of delivery to the addressee in the ordinary
course of mail .... [A] s soon as evidence is introduced that war-
rants a finding that the letter failed to reach its destination, the
artificial compelling force of the prima facie evidence disappears,
and the evidence of non-delivery has to be weighed against the
likelihood that the mail service was efficient in the particular in-
stance, with no artificial weight on either side of the balance."'2
RES IPSA LOQUITUR
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been held "applicable
where (a) the instrumentality causing the injury was under the
exclusive management and control of the defendant and (b) where
the accident occurred under such circumstances that in the ordinary
course of events it would not have occurred if ordinary care had
been observed." 123
There are a few early decisions that refer to res ipsa loquitur
as a presumption of negligence which shifts the burden of proof.
2
.
In Pennsylvania at one time it was held that "a presumption of neg-
ligence arose and thereupon the burden was shifted to the defend-
ant requiring of it to show use of . . . care and diligence .... ," 125
One authority contends that res ipsa loquitur should assume the
stature of a presumption in carrier and bailment cases, making it
mandatory on the jury, if unrebutted, and even "placing on [the
120 Griffin v. General Assur. Co., 94 Ohio App. 403, 410, 116 N.E.2d 41, 46
(1953).
121 Hobart-Farrell Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Klayman, 302 Mass. 508, 19
N.E.2d 805 (1939).
122 Id. at 509-10, 19 N.E.2d at 807.
123 Stoltz v. Colony Recreation Center, 151 Ohio St. 503, 87 N.E2d 167, 168
(1949).
124 Cleve. C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Hadley, 170 Ind. 204, 84 N.E. 13 (1907) ; Schecter
v. Hann, 305 Ky. 794, 205 S.W2d 690 (1947) ; Kearner v. Tanner Co., 31 R.I. 203,
76 Atl. 833 (1910). See also Annot., 167 A.L.R. 658, 663 (1947).
125 Doud v. Hines, 269 Pa. 182, 185, 112 Atl. 528, 529 (1921); see Moglia v.
Nassau Elec. Ry., 111 N.Y.S. 70, 127 App. Div. 243 (1908).
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defendant] the burden of proof requiring him to exonerate himself
by a preponderance of the evidence or make good the loss." 126
However, the maxim, in most states, despite being designated a pre-
sumption, has actually been treated as an inference.127
Ohio regards res ipsa loquitur as "a rule of evidence which per-
mits, but does not require, the jury to draw an inference of negli-
gence . , 128 Since "an inference is a deduction ...a jury may
attach probative value, or evidentiary weight, to such a deduction in
the same manner and to the same extent.., it may accept, reject or
attach probative value to positive testimony or direct evidence," 129
it is apparent that the inference would survive the test of contrary
substantial credible evidence, set forth in Ayers v. Woodard 130 for
neutralizing a presumption and causing its exit from the case.
In passing it might be mentioned that this doctrine, simple in
expression, has proved difficult in application in factual situations.
The doctrine was designed to help the innocent injured plaintiff who
does not know what, if any, specific act or acts of negligence of the
defendant caused his injury. Under the confused status of the law in
Ohio, he finds himself in a Serbonian bog. He can allege facts he
reasonably feels will require the application of the res ipsa rule.
However, he is not positive that the doctrine applies, and to make
sure he will get to the jury in the event the rule does not fit the
facts, or because he feels specific conduct or omissions of the de-
fendant within his knowledge constitute specific grounds of negli-
gence, he also alleges those in his petition. The plaintiff offers his
evidence and rests, content that either the doctrine or the proof of
the alleged grounds of negligence will get him to the jury. Does he
waive the use of the doctrine because he alleged specific negligence
and attempted to prove it, but failed? The Fink case (obiter) says
no; 131 the Winslow case says yes.132 A comprehensive article 3 3 on
the subject concludes by expressing the opinion that, despite Wins-
low, "by alleging specific negligence and attempting to prove it, the
pleader did not waive the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur." 134 However,
the writer warns that "the effect of the Winslow decision will
126 Prosser, Torts 235 (3d ed. 1964).
127 McCormick, Evidence 643, 644 (1954).
128 Schafer v. Wells, 171 Ohio St. 506, 172 N.E.2d 708 (1961); Renneckar v.
Canton Terminal Restaurant, Inc. 148 Ohio St. 119, 73 N.E.2d 498 (1947).
122 Ayers v. Woodard, 166 Ohio St. 138, 145, 140 N.E2d 401, 406 (1957).
130 Supra note 129.
131 Fink v. New York Central R.R., 144 Ohio St. 1, 56 N.E2d 456 (1944).
132 Winslow v. Ohio Bus Line Co., 148 Ohio St 101, 73 N.E.2d 504 (1947).
133 Knepper, "Pleading in Res Ipsa Loquitur Cases," 23 Ohio St. L.J. 450 (1962).
134 Id. at 459.
1965]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
continue to raise some doubts until the supreme court makes a
positive statement on the subject in a case in which the question is
directly presented." 135
THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY
From time immemorial, the presumption that a child born in
wedlock is legitimate has been regarded as "one of the strongest and
most persuasive known to the law." 136 It finds its genesis in a
deeply-rooted judicial antipathy to bastardizing a child who, under
the common law, is thereafter unable to inherit, is considered fi/ius
nuljIRs, and is socially stigmatized. The law reasons that the proba-
bility is strong that such a child is legitimate, that it would be unfair
to place on him the impossible burden of proving it, and that it
would be good public policy to assume that children born in wedlock
are not bastards. Therefore, it is held that "every child begotten in
lawful wedlock is presumed in law to be legitimate." -13
In its inception, the presumption was practically unassailable.
The English courts simply held that if a husband, not physically
incapable, was within the four seas of England during the period of
gestation, the judge would not listen to evidence casting doubt on
his paternity. "The rule of the four seas" was, in essence, an irre-
buttable presumption. That inflexible "presumption" has been the
object of historical development and evolution, and its unsoundness
and patent unfairness in time had to yield to reason. Once "the rule
of the four seas" was denounced and rejected in Pendrell v. Pen-
drell 138 the presumption was regarded as rebuttable. It then became
a matter of the quantity and quality of the evidence required to
shatter it. The inexorable presumption gave way to the doctrine
that a finding of no access-no opportunity for sexual connection-
could liquidate the presumption. He who had the burden of proving
non-access had to do so by "clear and convincing evidence," by
proof "to the satisfaction of the jury," by proof "beyond all reason-
able doubt," or by "strong, distinct, satisfactory and conclusive
proof." 139 Cardozo, in a scholarly and enlightening opinion, after
tracing the origin and history of the rule, observed that, "What is
meant by these pronouncements, however differently phrased, is this,
and nothing more, that the presumption will not fail unless common
135Ibid. Cf. Oberlin v. Friedman, 1 Ohio App. _d 499 (1965) (following
Winslow).
136 In re Findlay, 253 N.Y. 1, 7, 170 N.E. 471, 472 (1930).
137 State ex rel Walker v. Clark, 144 Ohio St. 305, 309, 58 N.E.2d 773, 775
(1944).
138 2 Str. 925, 93 Eng. Rep. 945 (K.B. 1733).
139 See Note, "Presumption of Legitimacy of a Child Born in Wedlock," 33
Harv. L. Rev. 306 (1919).
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sense and reason are outraged by a holding that it abides." 140 In
another oft-cited case the court argued that it takes evidence beyond
a reasonable doubt of non-access to explode the presumption, and at
the same time asserted that this requirement has nothing to do with
the presumption, but results only from the fact that in a case involv-
ing the presumption of legitimacy, "the degree of proof to establish
illegitimacy is fixed by a rule of substantive law.., this rule accom-
panies the presumption ... it is the rule and not the presumption
that fixes the burden . .. of proof." 141 Of course, the foregoing
analysis merely follows the Thayerian principle that the burden of
proof never shifts as a result of a presumption. Thus, Thayer stated,
the rule as to legitimacy results more accurately from a substantive
rule of law that accompanies the particular presumption. Con-
sistency compelled him and those who supported him to invoke the
substantive-rule-of-law concept, even where the presumption was
rebuttable, rather than admit that the presumption of legitimacy
is an exception to this rule.
Despite Thayer, practically all other writers and decisions main-
tain that once the presumption of legitimacy is created, the burden
of persuasion shifts to the opponent. The cases are legion to that
effect, 142 and the Model Code of Evidence adopted the modern rule
in general form by virtue of rule 703 .143
Ohio was long committed to the rigid rule that "before such
child can be adjudged a bastard the proof must be clear, certain, and
conclusive, either that the husband had no powers of procreation, or
the circumstances were such as to render it impossible that he could
be the father of the child." 144 However, in 1944, the Ohio Supreme
Court announced that the former Ohio rule was "nearly as rigid as
the ancient English rule of the four seas," and decided that the law
in Ohio should be that "while every child conceived in lawful wed-
lock is presumed legitimate, such presumption is not conclusive and
may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that there were
no sexual relations between husband and wife during the time in
which the child must have been conceived." 141 With regard to the
quality of the rebuttal evidence required in Ohio, subsequent cases
have stated that the presumption is overcome only by strong and
convincing evidence.1 46
140 In re Findlay, supra note 136, at 8, 170 N.E. at 473.
141 In re Jones Estate, 110 Vt. 438, 448, 8 A.2d 631, 633 (1939).
142 Annot., 128 A.L.R. 713, 720 (1940).
143 See note 43 supra.
144 Powell v. State ex rel. Fowler, 84 Ohio St. 165, 95 N.E. 660 (1911).
145 State ex rel. Walker v. Clark, supra note 137, at 310, 312, 58 N.E.2d at 776.
146 See McGhee v. McGhee, 45 Ohio L. Abs. 465, 468, 64 N.E.2d 154, 156
(Ct. App. 1945). See also State ex rel. Satterfield v. Sullivan, 115 Ohio App. 347,
185 N.E.2d 47 (1962).
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THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
No presumption in the field of evidence has engendered more
heat and less light than the presumption of innocence.
There has been little doubt among most authorities that, upon
analysis, a presumption, especially if it has been rebutted, has no
evidential value. Nevertheless, some courts have clung tenaciously
to the notion that the presumption of innocence survives to the
bitter end, regardless of any contrary evidence, and should enter
the jury room. Even Wigmore, a Thayer disciple, maintained that
the presumption of innocence:
is in truth merely another form of expression for part of the
accepted rule for the burden of proof in criminal cases, i.e., that
it is for the prosecution to adduce evidence .. .and to produce
persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt.... However, in a criminal
case, the term does convey a special and perhaps useful hint, over
and above the other form of the rule about burden of proof, in
that it cautions the jury to put away from their minds all the sus-
picion that arises from the arrest, the indictment and the arraign-
ment, and to reach their conclusion solely from the legal evidence
adduced. 147
Another authority critically noted:
The language about this principle sometimes countenanced in
instructions to the juries is an outrage to common sense. Meta-
phor is piled on metaphor until the presumption of innocence, if
you really believe the talk, becomes a noble knight in gleaming
armor battling for the right from beginning to end of a crim-
inal trial and making it almost shameful to bring in a verdict of
guilty... [I]n a decently planned and operated system of prose-
cutions a true "presumption of innocence" has no basis in likeli-
hood or policy. . . .Needless to say, there is no public policy
favoring acquittal of the guilty.148
At one time, the Supreme Court declared that the presumption
of innocence "is recognized as a presumption of law and ... is evi-
dence in favor of the accused.' 49 This view was articulated in the
147 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2511 (3d ed. 1940).
148 Maguire, Evidence, Common Sense & Common Law 191, 192 (1947).
'49 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 460 (1894).
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United States as early as 1842 by Greenleaf in his works on evi-
dence, where he stated that the presumption "is to be regarded by
the jury, in every case, as matter of evidence, to the benefit of
which the party is entitled." 1r0 That concept still lingers in several
jurisdictions which treat the presumption as evidence; and most
jurisdictions insist that it requires the court to include the phrase
in the charge to the jury.'
In recent years, with very few exceptions, the courts have re-
fused to be beguiled by counsel into perpetuating the unsound and
illogical notion that this ritualistic presumption is evidence. In one
form or another, they now recognize that this presumption
is not, strictly speaking, a presumption in the sense of an inference
deduced from a given premise .... Once this so-called presump-
tion has placed upon the state the burden of proving guilt it has
served its chief purpose .... [I]t requires evidence of guilt, but is
not evidence of innocence. . . . [I]t "enters the trial with the
defendant" (but it does not) "go throughout" the trial .... [I]t is
not itself evidence, much less a "witness" for the defendant....
[W]e should not indulge the fiction that it necessarily "goes into
the jury room" with the jury. It does not "command" the jury to
find the defendant not guilty; it merely requires them to assume
his innocence .... Indeed, it should yield as to each respective
juror as soon as . . . such juror is by the evidence convinced
beyond reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.
15 2
The position in the federal courts, as expressed in Coffln v.
United States, 53 was later repudiated by the Supreme Court in
Agnew v. United StatesY54 The federal courts now regard the pre-
sumption as requiring evidence of guilt, but do not view it as evi-
dence of innocence. However, the federal law continues to insist,
that although it is not evidence, "it is a legal presumption, which
they [the jury] must consider along with the evidence . . .when
they come finally to pass upon the case." 15
The Ohio Supreme Court, as early as 1877, rejected all evi-
dentiary claims made for the presumption of innocence when it held
that "the benefit of the presumption of innocence was fully and
150 1 Greenleaf, Evidence § 34 (16th ed. 1899).
151 Williams v. State, 241 Ala. 348, 2 So. 2d 423 (1941) ; People v. Long, 407
Ill. 210, 95 N.E2d 461 (1950) ; Commonwealth v. Madeiros, 255 Mass. 304, 151 N.E.
297 (1926) ; Behrens v. State, 140 Neb. 671, 1 N.W.2d 289 (1941) ; Jones v. State,
13 Tex. Ct. App. R. 1 (1882).
152 Carr v. State, 192 Miss. 152, 156-57, 4 So. 2d 887, 888 (1941). The writer has
taken the liberty of rearranging the quoted excerpts.
253 Supra note 149.
154 165 U.S. 36 (1897). See also Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
155 Dodson v. United States, 23 F2d 401, 402 (4th Cir. 1928).
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practically secured to him [defendant] in the instruction that the
state must prove the material elements of the crime beyond a rea-
sonable doubt." 156 The court held the presumption of innocence
does not require a charge "that the defendant is, in law, presumed to
be innocent of the crime charged against him until every fact neces-
sary to convict him is fully proved." 157
CONFLICTING OR SUCCESSIVE PRESUMPTIONS
Conflicting presumptions occur when each litigant has estab-
lished basic facts which result in the creation of presumed facts
which are inconsistent with each other. Wigmore dislikes the term
"conflicting presumptions," explaining that such presumptions are
part of the problem of the burden of proof and accurately should
be designated "successive presumptions." 158
There are many cases involving conflicting presumptions. The
most common instance results from proof of successive marriages
by the same spouse. In one case, W established that she married
HI in 1916; that H1 disappeared in 1923 and was neither seen nor
heard from after that time. In 1928, W effected a common law
marriage with H2 with whom she lived until H2 died in 1935 as a
result of an accident while working. A child was born as issue of the
second marriage. W claimed she was H2's widow, and entitled to
death benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Laws of New
Jersey. H2's employer established that Hi's marriage was never
dissolved. Obviously, two conflicting presumptions have arisen. In
1928, since only five years have elapsed, there is a presumption of
continuance of life with regard to H1. On the other hand, there is
a presumption that W's marriage to 112 was valid upon consumma-
tion. Is W entitled to the death benefits? 159
In Simpson, v. Simpson "60 conflicting presumptions entered the
scene when plaintiff established that X was neither seen nor heard
of for eight years and therefore was to be presumed dead. Defendant
countered by saying that since X was concededly alive eight years
ago he was still alive by virtue of the presumption of continuance
156 Morehead v. State, 34 Ohio St. 212, 217 (1877).
157 Id. at 216-17. However, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.04 (Page 1953) provides
that, "In charging a jury the trial court shall state the meaning of presumption of
innocence .... "
158 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2493 (3d ed. 1940).
159 See Sillart v. Standard Screen Co., 119 N.J.L. 143, 194 Atl. 787 (Sup. Ct.
1937).
160 162 Va. 621, 175 S.E. 320 (1933).
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of life. This, of course, is merely a situation where both parties claim
opposite presumptions from the same set of basic facts. If one exists,
by hypothesis, the other cannot.
Gausewitz, although recognizing that courts sometimes do not
follow his rule, contends:
Because both parties cannot have the burden of producing evi-
dence upon the same issue at the same time, there can be no
problem of conflicting presumptions. The basic facts of each of the
conflicting presumptions operate merely as rebutting evidence of
the other presumption, and upon rebuttal each presumption ceases
to exist. If the basic fact of one presumption is not sufficient to
support an inference and that of the other is sufficient, the party
in whose favor the latter operates should prevail if there is no
other evidence in the record; but this is because he has the evi-
dence and not because of a presumption.'
Under the Model Code of Evidence conflicting presumptions
cannot occur because the presumption merely requires the opponent
to introduce contrary rebuttal evidence and when so offered, even
in the form of basic facts which result in a conflicting presumption,
the proponent's presumption automatically vanishes. Rule 704,162
according to Gausewitz, merely expresses the position of Thayer
which Wigmore approved.6 3 On the other hand, a contrary position,
well sustained by many decisions, has been taken, holding, as
between conflicting presumptions, the presumption rooted in the
stronger policy should triumph. For example, to recall our hypo-
thetical case, "the presumption supporting the validity of the mar-
riage is one founded upon public policy, and upon innocence of
crime, and it is well settled that such presumptions overcome the
presumption of the continuation of the life of a person even three or
four years absent." 164 The ancient rule to that effect is well sus-
tained in modem times, especially where the dissipation of the
presumption would result in an inference of criminal conduct or in
the birth of an illegitimate child.'65
161 Gausewitz, "Presumptions in a One-Rule World," 5 Vand. L. Rev. 324, 335-
36 (1952).
162 See note 43 supra.
163 Thayer, Evidence 346 (1898) ; 9 Wigmore op. cit. supra note 158, at § 2493.
164 Sillart v. Standard Screen Co., supra note 159, at 146, 194 Atl. at 788. See
also cases in Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 7, 34-45 (1955); Morgan, "Some Observations
Concerning Presumptions," 44 Harv. L. Rev. 906, 941 n.41 (1931).
165 See Stein v. Stein, 66 Ill. App. 526 (1896) ; Klein v. Landeman, 29 Mo. 259
(1860).
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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRESUMPTIONS
There are many instances where legislatures, seeking to give
expression to a desired policy, have enacted statutory presumptions.
How far can these presumptions go without violating the Consti-
tution?
Wigmore contends that a presumption either imposes a duty
to come forward with rebuttal evidence or shifts the burden to the
opponent to disprove the presumed fact. Further, these matters are
procedural and have always been within the province of the legis-
lature to amend so long as the law does not infringe on judicial
prerogatives. He argues that, if the opponent fails to introduce
evidence at all and the presumed fact results from proof of the basic
fact, the opponent's failure to adduce evidence, not the statute, has
brought his downfall. Consequently, the requirement of a rational
connection between the basic fact and the presumed fact is unsound
and unnecessary.1 66 Wigmore's argument may appear logical, but
this theory has not received judicial sanction.
The United States Supreme Court, in an early case, Mobile,
J. &, K. C. R.R. v. Turnipseed,167 upheld a Mississippi statute
which provided that proof of injury inflicted by the operation of a
train should be prima facie evidence of want of reasonable care on
the part of the railroad company's employees, holding that there
was no denial of due process so long as there was "some rational con-
nection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed,
and that the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not
be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate." 168 In this
case the law merely cast upon the railroad the duty of coming
forward with some evidence to the contrary, whereupon the pre-
sumption was extinguished and the jury was left to decide the case
on all the evidence. The meaning of the rule in Turnipseed can best
be seen by its treatment in Ferry v. Ramsey,'69 where a minority
of the Court would have used it to invalidate a Kansas statute
imposing presumptive liability on bank directors for accepting
deposits while their bank was insolvent.
In 1929, in Western & Atlantic R. R. v. Henderson,170 a Georgia
statute provided that a railroad should be liable for any damage
done by the running of a locomotive unless the company should
prove that their agents had exercised all ordinary and reasonable
care and diligence, the presumption in all cases being against the
166 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1356 (3d. ed. 1940).
167 219 U.S. 35 (1910).
168 Id. at 43.
169 Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88 (1928).
170 279 U.S. 639 (1929).
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company. This statute, unlike that in Turnipseed, transferred the
burden of persuasion to the defendant by virtue of a presumption
whose basic fact was merely a collision resulting in injuries; and,
in addition, gave the presumption the "effect of evidence to be
weighed against opposing testimony and . . . [prevalence] unless
such testimony is found by the jury to preponderate." 171 Distin-
guishing Turnipseed, the Supreme Court held the Georgia statute
invalid, stating:
The mere fact of collision between a railway train and a vehicle
at a highway grade crossing furnishes no basis for any inference
as to whether the accident was caused by negligence of the rail-
way company or of the traveler on the highway or of both or with-
out fault of anyone.... The presumption... is unreasonable and
arbitrary and violates the due process clause ... ."1 72
Both Holmes and Cardozo went so far as to maintain that
even in criminal cases "it is consistent with all the constitutional
protections of accused men to throw on them the burden of proving
facts peculiarly within their knowledge and hidden from discovery
by the Government." 1
73
The decisions are manifold that within limits of reason and fairness
the burden of proof may be lifted from the state in criminal prose-
cutions and cast on a defendant. The limits are in substance these,
that the state shall have proved enough to make it just for the
defendant to be required to repel what has been proved with
excuse or explanation, or at least that upon a balancing of con-
venience or of the opportunities for knowledge the shifting of the
burden will be found to be an aid to the accuser without subjecting
the accused to hardship or oppression.174
About a decade later the same Court, speaking through Justice
Roberts, agreed that the court's standards for statutory presump-
tions are these:
The first is that there be a rational connection between the facts
proved and the fact presumed; the second that of comparative con-
venience of producing evidence of the ultimate fact. We are of the
opinion that these are not independent tests but that the first is
controlling and the second but a corollary....
The argument from convenience is admissible only where the in-
ference is a permissible one, where the defendant has more con-
171 Id. at 644.
172 Id. at 642-43, 644.
'73 Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 418 (1928).
174 Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 88-89 (1934).
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venient access to the proof, and where requiring him to go forward
with proof will not subject him to unfairness or hardship."75
It thus appears that
a statutory presumption can fix neither the burden.of going for-
ward nor the burden of persuasion in either a criminal or civil
case unless there is a logical connection between the basic fact and
the presumed fact, and in a criminal case even a presumption with
the requisite logical connection is invalid if it operates to fix either
burden upon defendant unless its application will avoid proce-
dural inconvenience without unfairness or hardship to the de-
fendant. 17 6
As might be expected, then, the use of presumptions against a
defendant in a civil case is more readily accepted and accompanied
by fewer constitutional limitations than in a criminal case.
CHARGING THE JURY WHERE PRESUMPTIONS ARE INVOLVED
It is the duty of the court to instruct the jury correctly on the
law applicable to the issues, and the duty of the jury to apply that
law to the facts as they have found them from the evidence. This
requires and assumes that the jury understands the law as set
forth in the charge and will apply it correctly to the facts.
Where presumptions are involved the task of charging the jury
is not an easy one, since it involves the necessity of granting each
presumption the recognition it deserves under the law, i. e., of con-
forming to the decisions as to whether instructions on a particular
presumption, under the evidence, should be given at all, and, when
given, in what manner. This is a vexing area of the law which has
been argued almost endlessly by courts and commentators with
much subtle reasoning and very little harmony. One will find in
the upper level of research and judgment grave differences of opin-
ion with regard to the answers to questions raised by the charge. 78
175 Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463, 467, 469-70 (1943).
176 Morgan, "The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945," 59 Harv. L. Rev. 481, 504
(1946).
177 Authoritative doubt has been cast upon the validity of this assumption, for
candid judges and lawyers will acknowledge that in many cases it is extremely dif-
ficult for a jury to comprehend, digest, and correctly apply to the facts the governing
principles of law expounded by the court. It is commonly assumed that jurors often
refuse to follow that law even where they understand it. Consequently, instruction
to the jury as a guide to their conduct is reduced to mere futility if the law is unknow-
able or unintelligible. See Frank, Courts on Trial 122 (1949).
178 Falknor, "Notes on Presumptions," 15 Wash. L. Rev. 71 (1940) ; McCormick,
"Charges on Presumptions and Burden of Proof," 5 N.C.L. Rev. 291 (1927);
McCormick, "What Shall the Trial Judge Tell the Jury About Presumptions?" 13
[Vol. 26
PRESUMPTIONS UNDER OHIO LAW
Beset by the inherent difficulties of the task, there has resulted
an understandable and seemingly irrepressible urge on the part of the
courts to adopt one rule for all presumptions. At first blush, this
might seem to make the job of the trial judge simple. For example,
the Thayer view has been adopted by several courts in response to
that urge.179
However, there are courts that refuse to adopt one rule for all
presumptions. They are either bound by precedent as to particular
presumptions or have honored important policies which underlie
some presumptions. Others recognize the peril of resulting injustice
to a litigant in adhering to a one-rule philosophy. It is not unimagin-
able that those courts that have refused to adopt one rule for all
presumptions sense that by the very nature of presumptions there
would have to be exceptions to the one rule; that to follow one rule
with blind adherence would be ignoring the origin and purposes of
many presumptions created by the law.
Despite understandable qualms as to the capacity of the jury
to discharge its assigned task, the court must give them the correct
instructions when presumptions are in the case. This is not simple,
since the correct charge is dependent upon the view adopted by
the particular jurisdiction on: (1) the procedural effect of the par-
ticular presumption involved in the case; (2) the rule as to the
amount and quality of the evidence required to dispel the presump-
tion; (3) the law of the jurisdiction as to whose duty it is, judge
or jury, to determine whether the presumption has been liquidated;
(4) a correct judgment by the court as to whether the presumed
fact can be inferred from the basic fact or facts to permit the issue
as to the existence or non-existence of the presumed fact to get to
the jury without the presumption.
Those problems set forth confronting the trial court with regard
to presumptions in a case can be more readily discerned by the
illustration of a hypothetical case.
Let us assume that 0 owns a store and a truck used for delivery
purposes. He hires D, a driver, to operate the truck and make de-
liveries. While the truck is in the custody of D at 5:45 p.m. on a
working day, D strikes and injures T, who sues 0 for damages. T
can make a prima facie case as to all the necessary elements of his
Wash. L. Rev. 185 (1938); Morgan, "Instructing the Jury on Presumptions and
the Burden of Proof," 47 Harv. L. Rev. 59 (1933); Morgan, "Techniques in the
Use of Presumptions," 24 Iowa L. Rev. 413 (1939); Morgan, "Further Observa-
tions on Presumptions," 16 So. Cal. L. Rev. 245 (1943) ; Reaugh, "Presumptions and
the Burden of Proof," 36 Ill. L. Rev. 819 (1942).
179 See note 62 supra; see also Tyrrell v. Prudential Ins. Co., 109 Vt. 6, 23-24,
192 Ati. 184, 192 (1937) ; Model Code of Evidence rule 704 (1942).
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cause of action except agency, with regard to which he has no direct
evidence. However, by virtue of establishing the above basic facts,
he has the aid of a presumption that "a truck belonging to the de-
fendant . . . in the custody of the defendant's servant . . . with-
out more, sustains a presumption that the custodian was using it in
the course of his employment." 180 The following ramifications result:
first, when T rests, O's motion for a directed verdict based on
no direct proof by T of agency will be overruled, for once the basic
facts are established, the presumed fact of agency or authority must
be assumed. (Agency and scope of authority are hereafter used
synonymously.)
Second, if the defendant rested, or if he offered his evidence
in the case as to the other issues but introduced no testimony what-
soever on the issue of agency, the court would be compelled to direct
a verdict in favor of T on the issue of agency, since, under those
circumstances, the presumed fact is mandatory on the jury. In a
case involving another substantive area of law, a reviewing court
reversed a lower court and held in an action to quiet title that, if
the defendant by his pleadings admitted plaintiff owned the land
prior to filing suit, the presumption of continued ownership of land
formerly acquired would apply and the plaintiff would prima facie
make out his case, thus requiring defendant to come forward with
evidence.""- This is also well illustrated in Basham v. Prudential Ins.
Co." 2 where the beneficiary sued on an insurance policy alleging
accidental death. Proof of the basic facts raised the presumption of
accidental death and against suicide. The defendant could offer no
evidence on suicide. The court held the presumption was mandatory
and that an instruction to the jury to that effect was proper.
Under such circumstances there is no need to mention the pre-
sumption to the jury. The court need only tell them that for the
purposes of their deliberation, they must assume the presumed fact,
i.e., that D was driving the truck within the scope of his employ-
ment.
Third, let us further assume that 0 testified that D's working
hours were only until 5:00 p.m. each day and that D had no right
to be driving the truck at the time of the accident-that D was
then "on a frolic of his own." Assume that T can offer no rebutting
evidence on the issue of authority and that both parties rest. 0
moves for a directed verdict, contending that by virtue of his testi-
mony which justifies a finding contrary to the presumed fact, i.e.,
180 Fiocco v. Carver, 234 N.Y. 219, 222, 137 N.E. 309, 310 (1930).
181 Gatrell v. Salt Lake County, 106 Utah 409, 149 P.2d 827 (1944).
182 232 Mo. App. 782, 113 S.W.2d 126 (1938).
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that there is no agency, the presumption has been ousted and T
must fail.
Let us assume further with regard to the above facts, that it is
the opinion of the trial judge, correctly or incorrectly, that the basic
facts offered by T have no sufficient value as evidence of the pre-
sumed fact to support an inference of agency.: 3 There being no other
evidence on the issue of agency, some courts following Thayer, hold
that O's motion should be sustained. The Model Code of Evidence
is in full accord, for rule 704(A) (2) provides, "if there is evi-
dence justifying a finding contrary to the presumed fact, the judge
instructs the jury that the presumed fact does not exist."
Let us assume, however, that the trial judge decides that there
is probative value in the basic facts, which justify an inference of
agency by the jury. In that event, the court must overrule O's
motion and the case goes to the jury without any reference to the
presumption in either a special instruction or a general charge. This
is exactly the position taken in Ayers v. Woodard, where the court
found an inference from the basic facts on the issue of agency.
In such case the jury is merely told as part of the charge that they
should consider the evidence and that they may, but are not com-
pelled to, find the presumed fact-that the accident occurred within
the scope of D's employment.
In Ohio, if the trial court comes to the conclusion that the
evidence contrary to the presumption is not substantial credible
evidence or "evidence of a substantial nature which at least counter-
balances the presumption";""4 or if the case is tried in a jurisdiction
that refuses to destroy a presumption by contrary evidence which
emanates from an interested witness (0 or D); or if it is in a juris-
diction like California, Oregon, or Montana that treats the pre-
sumption as if it were evidence, then O's motion for a directed
183 Courts do not always agree whether a certain inference follows from the
same set of basic facts. For example, Judge Hand has evidenced a similar opinion
with regard to an inference of consent from the mere fact of ownership and custody.
Pariso v. Towse, 45 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1930). Laughlin has taken the opposite view.
Laughlin, "In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions," 52 Mich. L. Rev.
195, 213 (1952). In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 303 U.S. 161 (1938), the
Supreme Court found no logical correlation between the basic fact and the presumed
fact in a death resulting from violence, so as to permit an inference of accident to
go to the jury in the face of adequate rebuttal evidence of suicide by the opponent
of the presumption. However, Black, J., in his dissent, said "The extreme improb-
ability of suicide is complete justification for a finding of death from accident under
these circumstances." 303 U.S. at 176.
184 Quaere: Are these tests one and the same? That is, must the opponent's
evidence be substantial credible evidence which at least counterbalances the pre-
sumption?
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verdict would be overruled and the issue of agency-the existence or
non-existence of the presumed fact-would go to the jury. There
would be no need to mention the presumption. The Ohio court, after
advising the jury generally that the credibility of the witnesses is
their province, instructs them that they must find for T (because of
the presumption) on the issue of agency if T has proved the basic
facts by the quantity and quality of evidence required and they
should find for 0 on that issue if T has failed so to prove them, since
the court had preliminarily decided O's testimony is not credible
evidence of a substantial nature which at least counterbalances the
presumption of agency.
85
Fourth, let us further assume that T has offered evidence to
establish the basic facts but one or more of the basic facts are in
issue as a result of 0 and D's testifying that D was not hired as
a truck driver for 0, but was only a salesman in O's store who took
the truck that day without O's consent, having been specifically
told in the past he was not to drive the truck.
Where presumptions are not regarded as evidentiary and the
court is the sole judge of whether O's testimony or D's meets the
jurisdictional test to rebut the presumption and it so decides, the
presumption is thereby automatically expelled from the case.
Unless there is other evidence in the case on the issue of agency
(offered by T) a motion for a directed verdict by 0 would be sus-
tained.
If, on the same set of facts, the judge deems the evidence rebut-
ting the presumption inadequate, the motion for a directed verdict
is overruled, and the case goes to the jury. There need be no
mention of the presumption; the court merely instructs the jury
that if T has proved the requisite basic facts they must, in their
deliberations, assume as true the presumed fact of agency. Con-
versely, the court charges that if T has not proved the basic facts
by the evidence required, the jury must find that agency or author-
ity on the part of D does not exist.
If we assume, under either of the hypotheses, that it has been
established only that 0 owns the truck and D works for him, but
not as a driver, which basic facts give rise to an inference (despite
the fact that a presumption of authority might also arise, most
authorities hold these facts insufficient to raise a presumption),
there is no need on the part of the judge to mention anything about
the presumption. The judge merely instructs the jury that with
reference to the issue of agency they may, but are not compelled to
find that D was acting within the scope of his employment at the
185 Cf. Ayers v. Woodard, 166 Ohio St. 138, 140 N.E.2d 401 (1957).
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time of the accident. The case is treated exactly as if the presump-
tion had never been established.
CONCLUSION: AYERS v. WOODARD, BOON OR BANE?
Ayers' broad and sweeping language constituted radical surgery
on the subject of presumptions, which was suffering from misunder-
standing, confusion, and, in many cases, unskillful treatment by the
courts. However, the operation may prove worse than the disease,
for Ayers may well have opened a Pandora's box.'- 6
The court's opinion, in its eagerness to adopt for Ohio one rule
applicable to all presumptions, left much to be desired. As has
been heretofore demonstrated, its sweeping language will require
judicial interpretation. Well recognized presumptions, either for-
gotten by the court or inadvertently buried by the comprehensive-
ness of the language employed in the decision, will require subtle
disinterment and subsequent annexation as exceptions to the pro-
nounced rules governing presumptions. Otherwise, the opinion will
prove to be completely at odds with well established law. It is
questionable whether the court intended to go so far.
The ultimate result of Ayers and its "rule of disappearing pre-
sumptions," as heretofore pointed out, is that the trial judges now
have the power to determine whether evidence contrary to a pre-
sumption is sufficient to take from the jury the right to render a
verdict on evidence which, had the judge not found it overcome by
contradictory evidence, would have justified a verdict.
Unless the decision and law with regard to presumptions is
mere dictum, Ayers brought about the following: (1) reversed, sub
silentio, a long line of cases on what is required to eliminate a pre-
sumption from a case; (2) emasculated the power of the jury to
give full force and effect to a presumption, and the reasons for its
creation, by taking from the jury the authority to find that evidence
contrary to a presumption was insufficient to repel it, substantially
narrowing the usual province of the jury with regard to the deter-
mination of credibility of witnesses;8 7 (3) imposed additional
186 The recent case of It re Breece, 173 Ohio St. 542, 184 N.E.2d 386 (1962),
in the opinion of this writer, merely confirms the difficulties that beset the trial judge
when he is burdened with the rule of disappearing presumptions. Breece gives very
little help to the trial court already bewildered by its responsibility with regard to
presumptions, especially in view of the fact that the court stated and relied upon
cases decided both before and after Ayers in support of its judgment. See Charging
the Jury Where Presumptions Are Involved, supra at 214.
187 Mr. Justice Black, in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 303 U.S. 161
(1938), protested the Court's impinging upon the province of the jury. Black con-
tended that once a presumption enters a case, contrary evidence, regardless of its
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burdens on the trial court by encumbering it with the responsibility
of determining if the facts and evidence in the case give rise to an
inference; and, if not, whether the evidence of the opponent of the
presumption is substantial, credible evidence at least counter-
balancing the presumption; (4) left undefined the terms "substan-
tial" and "credible"; (5) held an inference is "substantial credible
evidence"; (6) disregarded, perhaps quite unintentionally, the im-
pact of the decision on the presumptions of legitimacy, innocence,
validity of a will upon probate, the statutory presumption of trans-
fers in contemplation of death and the presumption with regard
to receipt of a letter when properly addressed. These presumptions,
as has been noted, either shift the burden of proof or require some
explanation to the jury and are not automatically eliminated upon
the introduction of "substantial credible evidence."
Perhaps Ohio could simplify the entire subject by adopting
legislation similar to that of California, Oregon, and Montana.
These states, which have enacted practically similar statutes, have
strength, cannot wipe it out and thus deny the jury the right to determine the issue
as to the existence of the presumed fact.
Proof of death by external or violent means has uniformly been held to
establish death by accident. The extreme improbability of suicide is complete
justification for a finding of death from accident under these circumstances.
While it has been said that this proof of accidental death was based on
"presumption," in reality . . . what is meant is that a litigant has offered
adequate evidence to establish accidental death. To attribute this adequacy
of proof to a "presumption" does not authorize or empower the judge to
say that this "adequate proof" (identical with legal "presumption") has
"disappeared." If the evidence offered by plaintiff provides adequate proof of
accidental death upon which a jury's verdict can be sustained, mere con-
tradictory evidence cannot overcome the original "adequate proof' unless the
authority having the constitutional power to weigh the evidence and decide
the facts believes the contradictory evidence has overcome the original proof.
The jury-not the judge-should decide when there has been "substantial"
evidence which overcomes the previous adequate proof. Here, this Court holds
that at the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, the jury had adequate proof
upon which to find accidental death, and which would authorize a verdict
that insured died as a result of accident, but also holds that, after subsequent
contradictory evidence of defendant, the judge (not the jury) could decide
that plaintiff's adequate proof (presumption) had "disappeared" or had been
overcome by this subsequent contradictory testimony. This took from the
jury the right to decide the weight and effect of this subsequent contradictory
evidence. Such a rule gives parties a trial by judge, but does not preserve,
in its entirety, that trial by jury guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment to
the Constitution. I can not agree to a conclusion which, I believe, takes
away any part of the constitutional right to have a jury pass upon the weight
of all of the facts introduced in evidence.
Id. at 176-77 (dissenting opinion).
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made presumptions, by definition, a form of evidence; 88 each has
listed in the statute about forty of the common presumptions; each
has declared by judicial construction that, as a result of the statu-
tory definition of evidence, except in rare instances, only the jury
can determine if the presumption has been overcome.
Montana has gone as far as to hold that the evidence of the
opponent of the presumption must preponderate to destroy the
presumption. As a result, in those states, the presumption cannot be
uprooted by the introduction of contrary evidence; it goes to the
jury with other evidence of the proponent of the presumption, and if
there is no evidence other than the presumption on the presumed
fact offered by the proponent of the presumption, the jury, not the
court, decides whether the presumption has been extinguished by
the contrary evidence.
Construing the Montana Code, the court declared that:
Section 10604 clearly means that when positive evidence appears
it stands on one side and the presumption on the other, and the
trier of fact must weigh them both in determining the question.
This court has adhered to this view throughout its history. The
rule that the presumption stands even though controverted is not
necessarily based on a theory that it is evidence itself, but upon
the statutes. The legislature may define the effect of the presump-
tion as it has and even though, strictly speaking, it is not itself
evidence, there is no reason why the legislature cannot require
that a proven fact out of which the presumption arises be given
certain probative value which has the effect of evidence....
We can not say, under the Montana rule, that the circumstantial
evidence adduced by the defendant standing alone preponderates
against the circumstantial evidence adduced in behalf of the plain-
tiff when aided by the presumption. 8 9
California, Montana, and Oregon, as a result of their legislation
on presumptions, have obviated many problems. First, the judge
need not be concerned, as Ayers requires, with the task of correctly
determining whether an inference as to the presumed fact can be
drawn from the basic facts-not always an easy decision to make.
Secondly, the trial judge need not worry about whether the contrary
evidence that eliminates the presumption is "substantial" or "cred-
ible" or counterbalances the presumption. That is the exclusive
function of the jury. Third, since the presumption reaches the jury,
188 See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1957, 1961, 2061: Ore. Rev. Stat. 41.310 (1963);
Rev. Codes of Mont. tit. 97-301-5 (1947).
189 Lewis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 113 Mont. 151, 163, 165, 124 P2d 579,
584, 585 (1942).
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the judge need not be fearful of error when he mentions the pre-
sumption to the jury.
Under the present Ohio law, on the other hand (if the Ayers
pronouncements on presumptions are not regarded as dicta), it is
within the province of the trial court to determine the following:
first, that the opponent of the presumption is entitled to a directed
verdict with regard to the non-existence of the presumed fact if
reasonable minds can arrive at only one conclusion as to the non-
existence of the presumed fact. This was the position taken where
evidence was introduced contrary to the presumed fact in a case
where the opponent of the presumption had offered testimony
proving that the assured was alive, thus liquidating the presump-
tion of death after seven years of unexplained absence. 90 A directed
verdict was also granted to the opponent of the presumption of
accidental death when the opponent offered evidence that the death
resulted from suicide, which evidence the reviewing court found
as a matter of law to be of such quality that reasonable minds
could only arrive at one conclusion, that is, that the presumed fact
of accidental death did not exist.'- The Ayers test would require
the same ruling in both cases.
Second, the trial court may determine that the basic facts
give rise to an inference of the presumed fact. In this situation,
such inference can constitute "substantial credible evidence," result-
ing in no need for the trial court to treat the case as containing a
presumption. In fact, under such circumstances, it is error for the
court in its general charge or in requested instructions to mention
the existence of the presumption.
Third, the court may determine that where a party has
sought the aid of the presumption by non-production of evidence
with regard to the presumed fact and the opponent of the presump-
tion introduces evidence contrary to the presumed fact, the court
must determine whether such evidence is of a substantial credible
nature which at least counterbalances the presumption. If the court
finds that it is, the presumption goes out of the case.
Ayers did not specifically say the judge must make that pre-
liminary finding. However, if the trial court can and must elim-
inate the presumption from the case because the basic facts are
susceptible of an inference with regard to the presumed fact, it
must follow that it is likewise within the province, as well as the
duty, of the trial court to decide whether (though it finds no infer-
190 Brunny v. Prudential Ins. Co., 151 Ohio St. 86, 84 N.E2d 504 (1949).
191 Sheppard v. Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St. 6, 87 N.E2d 156 (1949).
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ence with regard to the presumed fact from the basic facts, such
as would eliminate the presumption) the evidence offered by the
opponent of the presumption contrary to the presumed fact is
nevertheless "substantial credible evidence," and thus oust the pre-
sumption from the case.
It would then appear, because of what has been determined
above, that if the trial court decides that the evidence of the
opponent of the presumption is not credible evidence of a substan-
tial nature which at least counterbalances the presumption, the
force of the presumption has not been repelled. However, since
there is such antagonism to the use of the word "presumption"
to the jury, the trial judge need not mention the presumption to
the jury, but merely instruct them that if they find that the pro-
ponent of the presumption has proved the basic facts by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, they must assume that the presumed
fact is true; and, conversely, if the proponent has not done so, then
the presumed fact does not exist and, if its proof is essential to the
proponent's case, they must find for the opponent of the pre-
sumption. 19 2
Finally, the court may hold there is no inference deducible
from the basic facts, and that the evidence offered by the opponent
of the presumption is "substantial credible evidence which at least
counterbalances the presumption" and which wipes out the pre-
sumption created by proof of the basic facts. The above conclusion
102 Ayers says once the presumption is eliminated it is error to mention it to
the jury, following Thayer and the Model Code of Evidence. This attitude is ap-
proved by Chamberlyne, 2 Chamberlyne, Evidence § 1085 (1911), and is reflected
in several opinions. See Note, 37 Minn. L. Rev. 629 (1953); Note, 24 Minn. L. Rev.
651 (1940). Judge Hand claims that, "If the trial is properly conducted the presump-
tion will not be mentioned at all." Alpine Forwarding Co. v. Pennsylvania Ry., 60
F.2d 734, 736 (2d Cir. 1932). McCormick contends
that this practice of keeping silent about the relevant presumptions in a case,
where the facts are disputed and must be submitted to a jury, abandons one
of the judge's useful opportunities . . . there are some situations in which
instructions on presumptions are essential and others in which the giving of
such instructions may often be expedient.
McCormick, Evidence § 314 (1954). The practice of informing a jury of presump-
tions is followed constantly in many states and is supported by some persuasive
opinions. See Hamilton v. Southern Ry., 162 F.2d 884 (4th Cir. 1947); Wellish
V. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 293 N.Y. 178, 56 N.E.2d 540 (1944); Wyckoff
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 173 Ore. 592, 147 P.2d 227 (1944); Karp v. Herder, 181
Wash. 583, 44 P2d 808 (1935) ; Worth v. Worth, 48 Wyo. 441, 49 P.2d 649 (1935).
According to McCormick, "The form books are replete with instructions and unques-
tioning acceptance of the practice of informing the jury of the presumption despite
the fact that countervailing evidence has been adduced." McCormick, op. cit. supra
at 667 nn.13 & 14.
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is a corollary of Ayers which holds the trial judge can find an infer-
ence from the basic facts, which inference constitutes the "substan-
tial credible evidence" required to eliminate the presumption from
the case.
L'ENVOI
The writer, as his former professor of evidence, Edmund
Morgan, prophetically predicted, "approached the topic of pre-
sumptions with a sense of hopelessness and has left with a feeling
of despair." Despite the experienced warning, one is sometimes
impelled to make the effort, futile though it might be. The author's
effort, perhaps, can be justified and his qualms find comfort in the
wisdom of a beloved judge who, more than thirty-five years ago
graphically described in the following words his feelings of futility
and frustration when afflicted with some of the perplexing problems
of the law:
"They do things better with logarithms." The wail escapes me
now and again when after putting forth the best that is in me,
I look upon the finished product, and cannot say that it is good.
In these moments of disquietude, I figure to myself the peace of
mind that must come, let us say, to the designer of a mighty
bridge. The finished product of his work is there before his eyes
with all the beauty and simplicity and inevitableness of truth.
He is not harrowed by misgiving whether the towers and piers
and cables will stand the stress and strain. His business is to
know. If his bridge were to fall, he would go down with it in dis-
grace and ruin. Yet withal, he has never a fear. No mere experi-
ment has he wrought, but a highway to carry men and women
from shore to shore, to carry them secure and unafraid, though
the floods rage and boil below.
So I cry out at time in rebellion, "why cannot I do as much,
or at least something measurably as much, to bridge with my rules
of law the torrent of life ?"...
I know the common answer to these and like laments. The
law is not an exact science, we are told, and there the matter ends,
if we are willing there to end it. One does not appease the rebel-
lion of the intellect by the reaffirmance of the evil against which
intellect rebels. Exactness may be impossible, but this is not
enough to cause the mind to acquiesce in a predestined incoher-
ence. Jurisprudence will be the gainer in the long run by fanning
the fires of mental insurrection instead of smothering them with
platitudes.193
193 Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science 1-3 (1927).
